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Unregistered4

Quote:
When one reads “forty four Ohio court appellate decisions”what procedure / strategy do you use to separate the’ chaff from the wheat’? 

 

As I understand the post, Andrew has simply done a keyword search of cases involving mortgage and foreclosure where the words "void ab initio" also appear.

 

As with any Lexis or WestLaw keyword search, this merely identifies a population of candidate decisions which might contain some further exposition on the desired topic, but might not.  So there will be both wheat and chaff.

 

The initial challenge by Camille was the identification of cases which supports her misunderstanding.  But there are no such cases.  There are a variety of cases which explain the contrary.

 

I think that Andrew's challenge to Camille and mn was to look amongst these cases to find any support for their thesis.  I am confident that there will be none, except for, perhaps, a few misunderstood cognovit judgment decisions.

 

The Ohio Supreme Court case cited earlier by Cliff is at the heart of the inarticulate muddle of Ohio jurisprudence:

 

"Although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction over an action, if a claim is asserted by one who is not the real party in interest, then the party lacks standing to prosecute the action. The lack of standing may be cured by substituting the proper party so that a court otherwise having subject matter jurisdiction may proceed to adjudicate the matter. Civ.R. 17. Unlike lack of subject matter jurisdiction, other affirmative defenses can be waived. Houser v. Ohio Historical Soc. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 77, 16 O.O.3d 67, 403 N.E.2d 965. Lack of standing challenges the capacity of a party to bring an action, not the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. State ex rel. Smith v. Smith (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 662 N.E.2d 366, 369; State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 251, 594 N.E.2d 616, 621."

State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, No. 97-1231, 84 Ohio St.3d 70 (Ohio 1998)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1147060796972079168[/QUOTE

 

Decisions and jurisprudence in most other places is much clearer.

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Walt

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A question:

When one reads “forty four Ohio court appellate decisions”what procedure / strategy do you use to separate the’ chaff from the wheat’? 

  

 

I cannot speak for Andrew, but I read every new Ohio appellate decision on mortgage foreclosure, checking for new decisions several times a week.  Most of these are still chaff.  A few contain some useful new expositions on the law.  I make notes as to the new decisions.

 

I do not rely upon others to read and interpret cases for me, because most other folks lack the context or understanding of the entirety of Ohio jurisprudence.

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t

Walt has given an exemplary exposition on the topic of void vs. voidable!

 

There are two appellate decisions out of the Ohio Court of Appeals within the past 24 hours which support Walt's insightful analysis:

 

State of Ohio ex rel. Stephen J. Smith v. Amin Hotels, Ltd. et al., 2012-Ohio-1317 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 2012)
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2012/2012-ohio-1317.pdf

 

Arliss Mtge. Co., L.L.C. v. Woodford, 2012-Ohio-1320 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 2012)

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/10/2012/2012-ohio-1320.pdf

 

The Admin Hotels case exemplifies a couple of principles relating to void vs. voidable orders, though the court of appeals needed to address only one to dispose of the case.  In that case, the parties to a foreclosure entered into an agreed order which seemed to expressly implicate the rights of non-parties to the action.  Moreover, the order seemed to adjudicate matters which by statute were reserved to the Ohio Public Utilities Commission.

 

Thus, the order was beyond the authority of the court to act, precisely the sort of issue that Walt discussed in his exposition. 

 

Separately, intervenor Columbus Southern argued that as a non-party to the action that the court's order could not possibly bind it as a non-party.  This argument is also correct and implicates the court's personal jurisdiction to enter an order against a non-party without notice or opportunity to be heard, implicating Federal due process issues.

 

The Arliss Mortgage Company case exemplifies the concept that even if a defendant has a legally valid argument, that when this argument is not timely presented to the trial court in the original proceeding or raised in a timely post-judgment motion to vacate that the issue is waived and that a party cannot use the Rule motions to alter a judgment out of time.  

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Un
“…Standing” is a plaintiff’s requirement, and … 
Defendants must establish “standing” to defend themselves.”
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MSF Moderator
Is Schwarztwald VOID or VOIDABLE?

Here is yesterday's oral argument in the Ohio Supreme Court.
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mn

Friday 6 April 2012

Voidable.

For any judge to entertain that the defendant would
still lose were the case to be dismissed and then
refiled would be allowing the rule on standing to be
relaxed based upon what MIGHT happen, as opposed
to ruling on the legal requirement for initiating a
complaint from the onset, when freddie mac had NO
standing at the time the case was filed.


Schwartzwald could win the lottery, or some other
defect in the case could surface, such as did Wells
Fargo have the authority to transfer to freddie?
The defendant's lawyer should have been stronger
on that point.

Rule on what was, not what might be...

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BISHOP
WHETHER A JUDGMENT IS VOID OR VOIDABLE AS INTENDED TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE UMPIRE ANALOGY IS PURELY A MATTER OF SEMANTICS....IN OTHER WORDS... UNTIL AN UMPIRE OR THE LEAGUE SAYS ITS A VOID JUDGMENT ....(NOT YET "DECLARED TO BE A VOID JUDGMENT") IT IS MERELY VOIDABLE (NOT IN THE LEGAL SENSE BUT, IN THE PRACTICAL EVERYDAY SENSE OF THE WORD). UNTIL THE TIME IN WHICH IT IS DECLARED VOID BY A TRIAL COURT (an umpire) OR THE APPELLATE COURT (the panel of umpires at the game) OR THE STATE SUPREME COURT (the baseball commissioner) OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (the league's body of owner's that direct the commissioner, establishes the rules of play, and directs their enforcement) THE JUDGMENT IN THE REAL EVERYDAY LANGUAGE AS APPLIED TO THE VOID JUDGMENT IS MERELY VOIDABLE. AGAIN, IT IS SEMANTICS...NOT A LEGAL SENSE OF THINGS.

IN OTHER WORDS, AS PREVIOUS POSTS HAVE INDICATED, THE JUDGMENT MUST BE ATTACKED AS BEING A VOID JUDGMENT BY TIMELY PLEADINGS AT THE APPELLATE COURT/SUPREME COURT LEVELS OR BY WAY OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS IN THE COURT OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. OTHERWISE, THE SHERIFF, WHOSE DUTY IT IS TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT BY WAY OF EVICTION, WOULD HAVE TO TREAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE COURT ORIGINALLY AS A VALID JUDGMENT. BUT, WITHOUT A PENDING CHALLENGE TO THE JUDGMENT ORIGINALLY ENTERED, THE SHERIFF MUST, WITHOUT NOTICE TO HIM OF A SUBSEQUENT COURT PROCEEDING, TREAT THE "VOID" JUDGMENT A VALID ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT....BECAUSE, THERE IS NO DECLARATION BY A COURT OF JURISDICTION THAT THE JUDGMENT IF A VOID JUDGMENT. SO, FROM THE SHERIFF'S PERSPECTIVE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE SO-CALLED VOID JUDGMENT IS MERELY VOIDABLE, AND MUST BE TREATED AS A VALID ENFCORCEABLE JUDGMENT.

SO...THE ISSUE OF VOID v. VOIDABLE MUST BE VIEWED IN THE PRACTICAL LEGAL SENSE OF THE EXISTING JUDGMENT, WHICH, UNTIL CHALLENGED IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING THAT ATTACKS ITS VALIDITY, IS MERELY, IN THE SHERIFF'S PERSPECTIVE, A POTENTIALLY VOID JUDGMENT (or voidable) (which it isn't yet since no court has declared it as a void judgment) THAT MUST BE ENFORCED DUE TO A LACK OF LEGAL CHALLENGE TO ITS VALIDITY.


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Martin

Quote:
WHETHER A JUDGMENT IS VOID OR VOIDABLE AS INTENDED TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE UMPIRE ANALOGY IS PURELY A MATTER OF SEMANTICS....IN OTHER WORDS... UNTIL AN UMPIRE OR THE LEAGUE SAYS ITS A VOID JUDGMENT ....(NOT YET "DECLARED TO BE A VOID JUDGMENT") IT IS MERELY VOIDABLE (NOT IN THE LEGAL SENSE BUT, IN THE PRACTICAL EVERYDAY SENSE OF THE WORD). UNTIL THE TIME IN WHICH IT IS DECLARED VOID BY A TRIAL COURT (an umpire) OR THE APPELLATE COURT (the panel of umpires at the game) OR THE STATE SUPREME COURT (the baseball commissioner) OR THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (the league's body of owner's that direct the commissioner, establishes the rules of play, and directs their enforcement) THE JUDGMENT IN THE REAL EVERYDAY LANGUAGE AS APPLIED TO THE VOID JUDGMENT IS MERELY VOIDABLE. AGAIN, IT IS SEMANTICS...NOT A LEGAL SENSE OF THINGS.

IN OTHER WORDS, AS PREVIOUS POSTS HAVE INDICATED, THE JUDGMENT MUST BE ATTACKED AS BEING A VOID JUDGMENT BY TIMELY PLEADINGS AT THE APPELLATE COURT/SUPREME COURT LEVELS OR BY WAY OF POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS IN THE COURT OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. OTHERWISE, THE SHERIFF, WHOSE DUTY IT IS TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT BY WAY OF EVICTION, WOULD HAVE TO TREAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE COURT ORIGINALLY AS A VALID JUDGMENT. BUT, WITHOUT A PENDING CHALLENGE TO THE JUDGMENT ORIGINALLY ENTERED, THE SHERIFF MUST, WITHOUT NOTICE TO HIM OF A SUBSEQUENT COURT PROCEEDING, TREAT THE "VOID" JUDGMENT A VALID ENFORCEABLE JUDGMENT....BECAUSE, THERE IS NO DECLARATION BY A COURT OF JURISDICTION THAT THE JUDGMENT IF A VOID JUDGMENT. SO, FROM THE SHERIFF'S PERSPECTIVE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE SO-CALLED VOID JUDGMENT IS MERELY VOIDABLE, AND MUST BE TREATED AS A VALID ENFCORCEABLE JUDGMENT.

SO...THE ISSUE OF VOID v. VOIDABLE MUST BE VIEWED IN THE PRACTICAL LEGAL SENSE OF THE EXISTING JUDGMENT, WHICH, UNTIL CHALLENGED IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING THAT ATTACKS ITS VALIDITY, IS MERELY, IN THE SHERIFF'S PERSPECTIVE, A POTENTIALLY VOID JUDGMENT (or voidable) (which it isn't yet since no court has declared it as a void judgment) THAT MUST BE ENFORCED DUE TO A LACK OF LEGAL CHALLENGE TO ITS VALIDITY.

 

Bishop, you continue to twist yourself and your argument into a pretzel.  Your arguments are incoherent.

 

Instead of simply making up interpretations, why don't you sit down and read the cases about void and voidable judgment?

 

If you do so, then you will find that the thoughtful posts of others earlier within the thread are generally quite correct and that your new posts are adding nothing to either the discussion or the understanding.

 

Wouldn't it be better to identify language within one or more leading case and use such cases for an exposition on the topic?  People's homes are at risk and posting ill thought out rants really is not helpful.

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MSF Moderator

The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920) ("Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply VOID, AND THIS EVEN PRIOR TO REVERSAL." [Emphasis added]; Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850); Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808).  

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF THE LAW THAT ALL PRIOR JUDGMENTS ARE VOID AB INITIO AND MUST BE VACATED FORTHWITH

1.               "A void judgment is a nullity from the beginning, and is attended by none of the consequences of a valid judgment.  It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not affect, impair, or create legal rights." Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).  The judgment being a mere nullity and open to collateral attack, any attempt, by process based upon it, to reach the property of the person against whom it is rendered, is an unlawful invasion of his rights of property, against which, in the absence of other adequate remedy, he is entitled to injunction.  An attempt to enforce by process such a nullity is as devoid of lawful authority as would be a seizure without process.” (with emphasis) August Kern Barber Supply Co. v. Freeze, 96 Tex. 513, 516, 74 S.W. 303, 304 (1903).  The homeowner’s ejectment from their property was devoid of lawful or legal authority; was a seizure without due process and an unlawful invasion of the homeowner's rights of property. (See Kern)

2.               Plaintiff requests this Court take judicial notice of Exhibit-B, certified as fraudulent, as it presents the Court with prima facia evidence that the Banksters were never the owner or holder of the Note or Deed of Trust at the times they filed the foreclosure action, and obtained judgment, and therefore lacked legal standing or legal authority to obtain judgment in the action. The documents support the Court was patently devoid of jurisdiction to grant judgment; and any judgment rendered without jurisdiction is not voidable – but void.

3.               A judgment is void if it is shown that the court lacked jurisdiction 1) over a party or the property; 2) over the subject matter; 3) to enter a particular judgment; or 4) to act as a court. Jurisdiction could not be conferred by waiver or retroactively. Elna Pfeffer et al v. Alvin Meissner et al (11/23/55) 286 S.W.2d 241.  A void judgment, insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity, Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. - Waco 1951).

4.               A void judgment is a nullity, a brutum fulmen and is subject to collateral attack and may be stricken at any time. The passage of time cannot make valid that which has always been void. Dollert v. Pratt-Hewitt Oil Corporation, Tex. Civ. Appl, 179 S.W.2d 346, 348. (Also, see Corpus Juris Secundum, “Judgments” §§ 499, 512 546, 549.)

5.               The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920) ("Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply VOID, AND THIS EVEN PRIOR TO REVERSAL." [Emphasis added]; Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.Ed. 1170, 1189 (1850); Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808).  

6.               The Court did act beyond its authority, and certainly in contravention of it, and the homeowner seeks a declaration that the Court’s judgments and orders are a nullity, and any judgments, orders, or acts borne out of a breeder void judgment would not be any less repugnant and would, consequentially, be equally VOID.  A judgment not merely erroneous, but an absolute nullity, can have no binding force, either in the tribunal in which it was rendered or in any other in which it may be brought in question. 25 Tex. Jur. 551, Sec. 156.

7.               "The court has not only the power but the duty to vacate the inadvertent entry of a void judgment at any time… with or without a motion therefor.” Bridgman v. Moore 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W. 2d 705, 707.  The following authorities are in accord with the rule announced in the Bridgman case: Mosier v. Meek Tex Civ. App., 235 S.W. 2s 686; Barton v. Montex Corporation, Tex. Civ. App., 295 S.W. 950.

8.               A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law - no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody.  It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). Also, a void judgment has been defined as "one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally." Black's Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758).

9.               It has also been held that "It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.' Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.)

(Emphasis added)

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t

In a prior post, I applauded Walt's thoughtful exposition on the subject of void vs. voidable judgments.  Walt's explanation is superior to that posted by anyone else.

 

The post by the MSF Moderator is also helpful and in several respects generally supportive of what Walt posted, but can also somewhat muddle and confuse.

 

The MSF Moderator is also to be applauded in at least posting some cases.  Regrettably, many of these cases are ancient and in some instances may no longer be a valid current expression of Texas law on the subject.

 

Where these decisions are helpful is in showing that Bishop's muddled post is wrong.  As previously pointed out by Walt, there is a difference between a void judgment and a voidable judgment.

 

The judgment which is void is a nullity.  The judgment which is merely voidable needs to be timely appealed.  Many pro se litigants, and particularly the ill informed such as Bishop continue to confuse these concepts and conflate the holdings in void cases to also apply to voidable cases.

 

Those of the Texas cases cited which show that a void judgment is a nullity are still generally valid Texas law.  But those cases distinguishing which cases are void and which are merely voidable are in several instances dated.

 

The first cited authority is from U.S. cases and seems to still be generally valid as to U.S. courts and law:

 

Quote:
The law is well-settled that a void order or judgment is void even before reversal. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920) ("Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply VOID, AND THIS EVEN PRIOR TO REVERSAL." [Emphasis added];
 

 

See:

 

Robinson v. Edler, 78 F. 2d 817 (9th Cir. 1935)
United States v. Ickes, 84 F. 2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1936)
Coastal Recreation v. Inland Sailboats, 595 F. 2d 332 (5th Cir. 1978)
Burleson v. Coastal Recreation, Inc., 595 F. 2d 332 (5th Cir. 1978)
American Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F. 3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006)

 

However, it should be noted that this holding is not binding upon state courts except as it implicates U.S. Constitutional (e.g. due process or comity) issues which constrain the authority of state courts.

 

The date of the holding in August Kern Barber Supply Co. v. Freeze, 96 Tex. 513, 516, 74 S.W. 303, 304 (1903) is expressly shown and speaks for itself.

 

The cited holding in Thompson v. Thompson is NOT current Texas law as I will further explained below, as it fails to distinguish between void and voidable judgments.

Quote:
A judgment is void if it is shown that the court lacked jurisdiction 1) over a party or the property; 2) over the subject matter; 3) to enter a particular judgment; or 4) to act as a court. Jurisdiction could not be conferred by waiver or retroactively. Elna Pfeffer et al v. Alvin Meissner et al (11/23/55) 286 S.W.2d 241. A void judgment, insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity, Thompson v. Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. - Waco 1951)

 

This holding appears to still be valid:

 

Quote:
A void judgment is a nullity, a brutum fulmen and is subject to collateral attack and may be stricken at any time. The passage of time cannot make valid that which has always been void. Dollert v. Pratt-Hewitt Oil Corporation, Tex. Civ. Appl, 179 S.W.2d 346, 348. (Also, see Corpus Juris Secundum, “Judgments” §§ 499, 512 546, 549.)
 

 

The holding in Barton v. Montex Corporation, Tex. Civ. App., 295 S.W. 950, a decision from 1927, is often confused, distorted or conflated: 

 

Quote:
"The court has not only the power but the duty to vacate the inadvertent entry of a void judgment at any time… with or without a motion therefor.” Bridgman v. Moore 143 Tex. 250, 183 S.W. 2d 705, 707.  The following authorities are in accord with the rule announced in the Bridgman case: Mosier v. Meek Tex Civ. App., 235 S.W. 2s 686; Barton v. Montex Corporation, Tex. Civ. App., 295 S.W. 950.
 

 

See for example the holding in ZEECON WIRELESS v. AMERICAN BANK OF TEXAS, 305 SW 3d 813 (Tex. App. -- Austin 2010).

 

Mosier is a 1950 decision.  Bridgman v. Moore is a 1944 decision.

 

A court lacking jurisdiction cannot touch even a void judgment, as will be further explained.

 

While this holding is probably still valid, it does NOT implicate merely voidable judgments:

 

Quote:
A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law - no judgment at all, having no force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. It is good nowhere and bad everywhere, and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity. Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1938, n.w.h.); 34 Tex.Jur., Sec. 262, page 177; Maury v. Turner, 244 S.W. 809, (Tex.Com.App., 1922). Also, a void judgment has been defined as "one which has no legal force or effect, invalidity of which may be asserted by any person whose rights are affected at anytime and at any place directly or collaterally." Black's Law Dictionary; Reynolds v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 80 S.W.2d 1087, (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1935, writ ref.); Gentry v. Texas Department of Public Safety, 379 S.W.2d 114, 119, (Tex.Civ.App., Houston, 1964, writ ref., n.r.e., 386 S.W.2d 758).
 

 

This holding, as written is also still probably valid, but again would NOT apply to a merely voidable judgment:

 

Quote:
It has also been held that "It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.' Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.)
 

 

*

 

So what cases actually articulate current Texas law on this subject.

 

Any investigation should always start with Dikeman v. Snell:

 

“In Fulton v. Finch, supra, Judge Norvell wrote for the Court in holding that the entry of an order after the trial court had lost jurisdiction under Rule 329b was ‘void on its face,’ and said:

 

An order which proclaims its voidness upon its face needs no appellate action to proclaim its invalidity.  It is one thing to say that a void order may be appealed from but it is another thing to say that it must be appealed from for it would be anomalous to say that an order void upon its face must be appealed from before it can be treated as a nullity and disregarded.’ 346 S.W.2d at 830. [emphasis added]”.

 

Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183 at 186, 1973 Tex. LEXIS 257, 16 Tex. Sup. J. 183 (Tex. 1973).

Note that this is consistent with prior articulations as to void judgments, but distinguishes that the key issue is whether the judgment is void on its face.

 

Here is the key holding from Fulton v. Finch:

 

“A judgment which discloses its invalidity upon its face is a nullity and may be disregarded anywhere at any time. … It has no efficacy and could have been ignored by the District Judge as it constituted no impediment to his proceeding with a re-trial of the case. While it is wholly unnecessary to appeal from a void judgment, it is nevertheless settled that an appeal may be taken and the appellate court in such proceeding may declare the judgment void. There is some similarity in this respect between a void order and an interlocutory order from which there is no statutory right of appeal. [emphasis added]” Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351 at 355, 356, 346 S.W.2d 823 at 827, 1961 Tex. LEXIS 627, 4 Tex. Sup. J. 489 (Tex. 1961)

Similarly, this is a more recent Texas holding:

 

“No authority need be cited for the proposition that a void judgment is an absolute nullity and, as such, confers no rights and binds no one. These propositions are elementary.” Richardson v. First National Life Insurance Company, 419 S.W.2d 836, at 842, 1967 Tex. LEXIS 296, 10 Tex. Sup. J. 535 (Tex. 1967).

 

Here is a little more:

 

“‘Judgments are void for lack of power in courts to render them when they are rendered contrary to constitutional or valid statutory prohibition or outside limiting constitutional or statutory authority. [citing Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. 1959)]’ Richardson, 419 S.W.2d 836, at 842 (Tex. 1967).

 

Read Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428 (1959).

 

Here is some more recent guidance from the Texas Supreme Court:

 

"Although the district court should have held a hearing on Owens' appeal before signing an order adopting the master's report, its failure to do so did not deprive it of jurisdiction to issue the order or make the order void.  A judgment is void only when it is clear that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990) (per curiam) (citing Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1987); Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam)); see also State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex.1973).  Mere failure to follow proper procedure will not render a judgment void.  See Ex parte Coffee, 160 Tex. 224, 328 S.W.2d 283, 291 (1959).

 

An order which purports to dispose of all issues and all parties, like the district court's first order, is a final appealable order.  See, e.g., Hinde v. Hinde, 701 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex.1985) (per curiam); Schlipf v. Exxon Corp., 644 S.W.2d 453, 454 (Tex.1982) (per curiam) (citing North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.1966)).  Errors other than lack of jurisdiction must be attacked within the prescribed time limits.  Cook, 733 S.W.2d at 140 (citing Browning, 698 S.W.2d at 363).  When Owens did not timely appeal from the first order, it became final.  The court of appeals erroneously determined that the district court's failure to hold a hearing deprived it of authority to [486] adopt the master's report, so that the first order was without effect and the district court maintained jurisdiction."

State ex rel. Latty v. Owens, 907 SW 2d 484 (Tex. 1995)

 

Read these decisions and then go back and re-read what Walt posted.

 

Bear in mind that although these Texas decisions are not binding elsewhere, they reflect mainstream American law as to void judgments.

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Martin

Here is what Walt said:

 

Quote:
Authority of a court can also be circumscribed by the timing of its exercise of jurisdiction.

For example, in most states trial courts retain the jurisdiction to alter or vacate their judgments through certain types of motions to vacate or set aside the judgment for a specific and definite period. Thereafter, the trial court loses its plenary jurisdiction over a case.

For example, suppose that judge enters a final order and the time to vacate or alter the order passes. If the judge later enters another order altering his original order or final judgment after the court has lost its jurisdiction to do so, then the latter order would be void ab initio in most places for lack of authority.

 

 

http://ssgoldstar.websitetoolbox.com/post/show_single_post?pid=1272859126&postcount=30

 

Here is what the Texas Supreme Court said in a case cited by t:

 

"It is well settled that a trial judge has no power to enter a nunc pro tunc judgment purporting to correct a judicial error in a previously rendered judgment after he has lost jurisdiction of the case by operation of Rule 329b. Finlay v. Jones, supra."
Dikeman v. Snell, 490 SW 2d 183 (Tex. 1973)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7559743654899012901

 

Seems like Walt got that right!

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Martin

Walt said:

 

Quote:
A second example previously mentioned is a judgment by a court which lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine a particular matter. Previously mentioned was bringing a suit in one county in respect of land located in another county. That example is jurisdictional in most places, but might be a non-jurisdictional venue issue in others. A more universal example would be bringing a suit in one state's courts (e.g Florida) to foreclose on a real property located in another different state (e.g. Ohio).

Similarly, in dividing authority amongst various courts in a state, some courts may lack the jurisdiction to hear certain matters. For example, in Texas the District Courts have jurisdiction over all suits involving title to land. If a suit for foreclosure was brought before a justice of the peace or in county court, any judgment as to title to land handed down by such court would be void ab initio for lack of authority by that court. A probate action brought in Texas District Court rather than a statutory probate court or county court would similarly be a matter for which the District Court lacked authority.

Similarly, in New York State, suits involving title to real property must be heard in the NY Supreme Court for a county. A NY justice court cannot decide a foreclosure case. In NY most probate or guardianship matters are handled in Surrogate Court. Since a district Justice cannot grant a divorce, a divorce order by such a justice would be void ab initio.

This is distinguishable from a decision by a court involving an error of law where the court has the authority to act, but then decides erroneously. The erroneous decision will usually be merely voidable through a timely appeal.

 

 

According to one of t's cases, the Texas Supreme Court said:

 

""But the important question in this case is not whether the judgment entered on the merits by the district court is an improper or fundamentally erroneous one, but whether it is wholly void.  If it is only an erroneous or irregular judgment and therefore voidable only, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals which grants respondent's motion or petition to set it aside and directs the reinstatement of the cause 432*432 for trial on its merits is itself erroneous.

 

. . .

 

Generally speaking, a judgment rendered by a legally constituted and organized court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to a suit will be held valid, Clayton v. Hurt, 88 Tex. 595, 32 S.W. 876, 877; Martin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 201 S.W.2d 810, 812, unless the particular judgment is one which the court had no power to render.  State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272; Cline v. Niblo, 117 Tex. 474, 8 S.W. 2d 633, 66 A.L.R. 916; State Board of Insurance v. Betts, Tex., 315 S.W.2d 279. Judgments are void for lack of power in courts to render them when they are rendered contrary to constitutional or valid statutory prohibition or outside limiting constitutional or statutory authority. State v. Ferguson, supra; Cline v. Niblo, supra; State Board of Insurance v. Betts, supraThey are not void when rendered in violation of statutory provision which is merely directory, Simmons v. Arnim, 110 Tex. 309, 220 S.W. 66; 25 Tex.Jur. 735-736, Judgments, § 276, or for purely procedural irregularity.  25 Tex.Jur. 809-812, Judgments, § 308.  But here, the judgment is subject to twin vices.  Our Rules of Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes.  If a statute had provided that all contested cases should, on appearance day, be set for trial and that no default judgment could be rendered in such a case until the day of its setting, we would not hesitate to declare void a judgment rendered in violation of the statute. That, in effect, is what Rule 330 (b) provides.  It is the purpose of the Rule to provide a party to a contested case with his day in court. By way of precedent, we have declared void a judgment of injunction rendered without the filing of a bond as required by Rule 684, Lancaster v. Lancaster, 155 Tex. 528, 291 S.W.2d 303.  Moreover, respondent was not only denied his day in court but the probate of the will of the decedent was set aside and a final judgment was entered invalidating the will without the taking of proof as to whether it was a valid or invalid will when the only proper judgment which the court was authorized to render, if any at all, was a judgment dismissing the application to probate the will for want of prosecution.""

 

Freeman v. Freeman, 327 SW 2d 428 (Tex. 1959)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12900138823177969359 

 

Walt is pretty sharp!  t is sharp, too!

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Martin

The Texas Supreme Court further distinguished its holding from Freeman in the Mapco case:

 

"It is also true that in Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 156, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433 (1959), this court stated, "Judgments are void for lack of power in courts to render them when they are rendered contrary to constitutional or valid statutory prohibition or outside limiting constitutional or statutory authority."  Given only this language from Freeman, the Carter parties' argument is reasonably plausible that the court of appeals judgment was "void" as contrary to the "statutory prohibition" that a majority of a panel must concur to render a decision, or beyond the authority of the court because the constitution requires the concurrence of a majority of a "section" of the court of appeals.
 
In fact, the argument does not withstand closer scrutiny.  We have spent considerable effort distinguishing and explaining the quoted language from Freeman in holdings that a court's action contrary to a statute or statutory equivalent means the action is erroneous or "voidable," not that the ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it may be circumvented.  For example, in El Paso Pipe and Supply Co. v. Mountain States Leasing, Inc., 617 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.1981), we expressly distinguished Freeman and held that conflict with then rule 329b, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, although a mandatory rule dealing with the trial court's plenary power, did not make the judgment "void"; the error had to be corrected through the ordinary appellate process or other proper proceedings.  Again, in Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex.1985), we expressly disapproved the quoted statement from Freeman to the extent it was construed to mean that "[i]f a judgment rendered by a trial court is void it may be set aside by that court at any time."  We further explained it was only a trial court judgment rendered without "jurisdictional power" in the sense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction that could be set aside by the trial court at any time.
 
If Middleton v. Murff failed to make it clear, we now expressly disapprove the quoted language from Freeman to the extent it is construed to apply to a court of appeals' plenary power.  Absent one of those rare circumstances that makes the judgment "void," the mere fact that an action by a court of appeals is contrary to a statute, constitutional provision or rule of civil or appellate procedure makes it "voidable" or erroneous.  A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.  Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1987); Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 362 (Tex.1985).  On facts substantially similar to the present case, this court in an ordinary appeal recently held the court of appeals' judgment was erroneous, and reversed and remanded the cause.  See Hayden v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 786 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.1990).  Despite its error, here the court of appeals had lost jurisdiction to correct it."

Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 SW 2d 700  (Tex. 1990)

While it is interesting to learn from century old cases, when there are more recent cases from courts of higher authority, as shown by t, the focus ought to be on the more recent cases.

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Martin

Walt said:

 

Quote:
In most states, courts distinguish between void and voidable judgments. Usually, for a judgment to be void, the judgment must be void on its face as where a court is totally lacking in authority to make the order or the judgment can be seen on its face to be contrary to law without reference to the facts or the record. Other judgments are usually merely voidable.
 

 

The Texas Supreme Court said:

 

"In Estate of Gripon, 610 S.W.2d at 542-43, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed fundamental error in rendering default judgment against the representative of the estate when an answer was on file.  That court relied on the conclusion of the court in Estate of Pewthers, to determine that such a judgment would be void.  443 S.W.2d at 395.  The Pewthers court relied in turn on Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433, in which this Court held that, because of a conflict with the rules of procedure, the rendition of a default judgment when an answer was on file was fundamental error.[2]
 
Freeman was expressly overruled on this very point in Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.1990). Following Freeman, this Court has taken a more restrictive view of fundamental error:

 

Fundamental or unassigned error is a discredited doctrine. Fundamental error survives today only in those rare instances in which the record shows on its face that the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely [395] affected as that interest is declared in the statutes and constitution of this state.

 

Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982) (citations omitted).
 
Lack of jurisdiction is far and away the most common example of fundamental error.  See, e.g., Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 817 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex.1991) (judgment against entity never made a party); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex.1990) (appellate court's assumption of jurisdiction over interlocutory order); Grounds v. Tolar I.S.D., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex.1986) (exclusive jurisdiction vested in another court).  Defects in procedure will rarely constitute fundamental error, however, and therefore, will not constitute grounds for reversal when they are raised for the first time on appeal.  See, e.g., Central Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.1986) (applicability of provision of APTRA to appeal of agency decision not fundamental error); Allison v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 703 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex.1986) (failure to join parties not fundamental error); Young v. Hodde, 682 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tex.1984) (summary judgment granting relief not requested in motion)."
Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 SW 2d 388 (Tex. 1993)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6519724052698562199

 

It seems as though Walt was spot on!  Thanks t!!

 

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Martin

There seem to be a lot of recent Texas cases supporting Walt's analysis.  Here is another:

 

"Although Roccaforte's interlocutory appeal was supposed to stay all proceedings in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal,[4] Roccaforte did not object to the trial court's rendition of judgment while the stay was in effect.  To the contrary, he affirmatively moved for entry of judgment. Because a final judgment frequently moots an interlocutory appeal,[5] we must decide whether the trial court's failure to observe the stay made the final judgment void or merely voidable.  If the final judgment is void, it would have no impact on this interlocutory appeal.  Lindsay v. Jaffray, 55 Tex. 626 (Tex.1881) ("A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment.") (quoting FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS, § 117).[6]  If voidable, then we must decide whether it moots this proceeding.  See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.2010) (observing that voidable orders must be corrected by direct attack and, unless successfully attacked, become final). We conclude it is voidable.

 

. . .

 

We agree with those decisions that have held that a party may waive complaints about a trial court's actions in violation of the stay imposed by section 51.014(b).  That stay differs from a situation in which the relevant statute vests "exclusive jurisdiction" in a particular forum.  See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370 (1940) (noting that bankruptcy law in effect at the time "vested in the bankruptcy courts exclusive jurisdiction" and "withdr[ew] from all other courts all power under any circumstances").  For that reason, we have held that actions taken in violation of a bankruptcy stay are void, not just voidable.  Cont'l Casing Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 751 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex.1988).[7]
 
But as we have noted, "a court's action contrary to a statute or statutory equivalent means the action is erroneous or `voidable,' not that the ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it may be circumvented."  Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex.1990); cf. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex.2004) (noting that failure to comply with a non-jurisdictional statutory requirement may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived).  That is the case here.  The trial court's rendition of final judgment while the stay was in effect was voidable, not void, and Roccaforte's failure to object to the trial court's actions waived any error related to the stay.  We must, therefore, confront the fact that the trial [924] court signed a final judgment disposing of all parties and all claims and that Roccaforte did not present in his appeal from that judgment the arguments he advances in this interlocutory appeal."
Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 SW 3d 919 (Tex. 2011)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11700922934293024684

 

Of course, Bishop can probably think up some new baseball analogy which he will post in ALL CAPS to prove that it is more authoritative and persuasive than Texas Supreme Court decisions. 

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BISHOP
AGAIN MY FRIENDS, THE ANALOGY IS TO ASSIST THE NON-LEGAL PERSON TO GET TO THE COURT TO ATTACK YOUR "SO-CALLED" VOID JUDGMENT BY LEGAL PROCESS...

BECAUSE AS THE ONE UMPIRE STATES..."IT AINT NOTHING TILL I CALL THEM"

THE JUDGMENT, WHETHER VOIDABLE OR VOID DOESN'T MATTER TO THE SHERIFF...HIS ACTIONS TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT, WHETHER RIGHT OR WRONG ARE SOLELY BASED ON WHAT THE LAST COURT DETERMINED.

I DON'T BELIEVE THE MESSAGE IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAPABLE.
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Martin

Bishop still doesn't get it:

 

Quote:
AGAIN MY FRIENDS, THE ANALOGY IS TO ASSIST THE NON-LEGAL PERSON TO GET TO THE COURT TO ATTACK YOUR "SO-CALLED" VOID JUDGMENT BY LEGAL PROCESS...

BECAUSE AS THE ONE UMPIRE STATES..."IT AINT NOTHING TILL I CALL THEM"

THE JUDGMENT, WHETHER VOIDABLE OR VOID DOESN'T MATTER TO THE SHERIFF...HIS ACTIONS TO ENFORCE THE JUDGMENT, WHETHER RIGHT OR WRONG ARE SOLELY BASED ON WHAT THE LAST COURT DETERMINED.

I DON'T BELIEVE THE MESSAGE IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAPABLE.

 

Even though the Texas Supreme Court explained it rather clearly:

 

Quote:
“In Fulton v. Finch, supra, Judge Norvell wrote for the Court in holding that the entry of an order after the trial court had lost jurisdiction under Rule 329b was ‘void on its face,’ and said:

An order which proclaims its voidness upon its face needs no appellate action to proclaim its invalidity. It is one thing to say that a void order may be appealed from but it is another thing to say that it must be appealed from for it would be anomalous to say that an order void upon its face must be appealed from before it can be treated as a nullity and disregarded.’ 346 S.W.2d at 830. [emphasis added]”.

Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183 at 186, 1973 Tex. LEXIS 257, 16 Tex. Sup. J. 183 (Tex. 1973).

 

To elaborate on the MSF Administrator's previously posted case:

 

"Much has been written on void judgment. A void judgment is just no judgment at all. It is a nullity and has no force or effect whatever. It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or collateral. 2 Speer's Marital Rights in Texas, Fourth Edition, 580, Sec. 755; 34 T.J.2d 94, Sec. 227; 34 T.J.2d 177, Sec. 262; 49 911*911 C.J.S. Judgments § 434, p. 859; 30A Am. J. 197, Sec. 45. A void judgment cannot be cured by subsequent proceeding. 30A Am. J. 199, Sec. 46."
Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Texarkana 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.) [on rehearing]
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2654163542864443878

 

Compare:

 

Quote:

It has also been held that "It is not necessary to take any steps to have a void judgment reversed, vacated, or set aside. It may be impeached in any action direct or, collateral.' Holder v. Scott, 396 S.W.2d 906, (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1965, writ ref., n.r.e.)

 

Bishop continues to have a reading comprehension problem.  No one needs to "call" a ball or a strike.  When a judgment is truly void, it can be simply ignored by the sheriff with no further action.

 

Bishop continues to confuse and conflate voidable -- that is legally erroneous judgments -- with those that are actually void.

 

The sheriff cannot and will not ignore those judgments that Bishop would have us believe are void, because Bishop is mistaken and the judgment was merely voidable.  The voidable judgment must be attacked and set aside directly through a timely appeal or motion to vacate the judgment.  Otherwise, it becomes a final unappealable judgment.  The void judgment can be simply ignored, as it is a nullity confers no authority whatsoever. 

 

Again, as t noted, these Texas cases apply only in Texas, but are exemplary of the kinds of decisions reached by courts elsewhere.

 

The Holder v. Scott case involves a situation also described and anticipated by Walt.  In that case, the Texas Court of Appeals noted that two judgments one granted in Texas and another granted in Arkansas were void.  Realize that a Texas Court, not even a Texas appellate court can vacate an Arkansas judgment.  But it didn't need to.  It simply pointed out that the Arkansas judgment was void when granted and entitled to no respect in Texas.  

 

Bishop's incoherent posts add little to the conversation.  The authority posted by the MSF Moderator and t fully support what Walt previous explained. 

 

If Bishop wants to join the conversation, he needs to get some cases up and stop talking about baseball.  Bishop has been repeatedly given the opportunity to explain his position, but has rather clearly struck out.

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BISHOP
MY FRIEND,

I UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING QUITE WELL....YOU FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THAT A SHERIFF'S DUTY IS TO ENFORCE LEGALLY ISSUED ORDERS FROM A COURT...AND...WITH THE AUTHORITY OF A JUDGMENT ISSUED FROM A COURT, THE SHERIFF HAS A DUTY TO ENFORCE THE ORDER EVEN THOUGH IT IS VOID.

HE ENFORCES THE ORDER BY THE ACTUAL PHYSICAL FORCE OF HIS DEPUTIES OR EVICTION COMPANY THAT SHOWS UP AND TAKES YOUR THINGS OUT TO THE CURB...

TRY RESEARCHING THAT AND YOU WILL FIND THE AUTHORITY ASPECT OF EVICTIONS DISCUSSED.

WHAT IS MORE COMPELLING, IS THAT WE ALL KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MASSIVE INJUSTICE PERPETRATED UPON AMERICANS AND OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM ON THIS VERY ISSUE OF FRAUDULENT FILINGS OF FORECLOSURE BY SERVICERS AND "PLAINTIFFS" THAT HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FORECLOSE.

THE FAILURE OF OUR U.S. SUPREME COURT TO ADDRESS THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS ONCE AND FOR ALL ON THE ISSUE OF VOID v. VOIDABLE BASED UPON A PROVEN DISABILITY OF THE "PLAINTIFF" TO HAVE FILED THE ACTION IS THE CORE OF THE COMPLAINT.

ALL OVER AMERICA WE ARE SPENDING OUR WAY TO OBLIVION FOR DEFENDING THESE ACTIONS THAT HAVE NO BUSINESS BEING IN COURT.

A DETERMINATION BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT OR THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES THAT SUCH AN ACTION IS VIOLATIVE OF 18 U.S.C. 241 AND A JUDGE THAT CONDONES SUCH ACTION IS AUTHORIZED AND DUTY BOUND TO COMPLAIN (ALA HIMMLER) TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY BY A FORMAL COMPLAINT OF A CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE A HOMEOWNER OF THEIR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS ..........BADLY NEEDED...

OTHERWISE, WE ARE THROWING OUR MONEY AWAY ON MASSIVE FRAUD THAT WILL PERSIST FOR GENERATIONS....ALL OF THIS IS DONE BY THE HIGH COURT'S SILENCE ON ISSUES SUCH AS VOID v. VOIDABLE AND THE DUTY OF THE STATE COURT'S TO UPHOLD THE ESTABLISHED STATE LAW DECIDED BY THE HIGH COURT OF THE STATE THAT HAS RULED ON THE ISSUE. WHEN THE FACTS SHOW THAT THERE IS NO BASIS OR STANDING FOR A "PLAINTIFF" TO HAVE BROUGHT THE ACTION, THERE SHOULD BE SEVERE PENALTIES BY WAY OF SANCTIONS. IF THE PLAINTIFF STANDING PROBLEM PERSISTS, AND THE LOWER COURTS FAIL TO UPHOLD THE RIGHTS OF THE PROPERTY OWNER, THEN SEVERE DISCIPLINARY REPURCUSSIONS SHOULD BE FELT BY THE FAILURE OF THE JUDGE TO DULY RULE BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE. FOR IF HE SO FAILS, THEN HE HAS AIDED AND ABETTED THE OTHER SIDE IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO STEAL YOUR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

THE POWER OF SUCH A RULING WILL STOP THE MASSIVE FRAUD COLD.
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BISHOP
JUST A FOOTNOTE....A SHERIFF THAT IS AUTHORIZED BY A COURT ORDER TO EVICT HAS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. HIS AGENTS (HIS DEPUTIES OR HIS EVICTION COMPANY) ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

A SHERIFF HAS NO BASIS FOR REFUSING TO EXECUTE A JUDGMENT ORDERING EVICTION OTHER THAN A REASON FOR BEING ADVISED OF A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE JUDGMENT (WHETHER VOID OR VOIDABLE ...IT MATTERS NOT TO HIM). IT IS HIS DUTY TO EXECUTE THE ORDER. A FAILURE TO EXECUTE SUCH ORDER MAY RENDER HIM LIABLE SHOULD THE STATE'S ATTORNEY BRING A FORMAL CHARGE OF CONTEMPT OF COURT IN HIS FAILURE TO EXECUTE THE ORDER.
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Martin

Bishop, you contradict yourself in the first paragraph:

 

Quote:
 I UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING QUITE WELL....YOU FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THAT A SHERIFF'S DUTY IS TO ENFORCE LEGALLY ISSUED ORDERS FROM A COURT...AND...WITH THE AUTHORITY OF A JUDGMENT ISSUED FROM A COURT, THE SHERIFF HAS A DUTY TO ENFORCE THE ORDER EVEN THOUGH IT IS VOID.
 

A void order is not legally issued, it is a nullity and entitled to no respect whatsoever, by a court a sheriff or an armadillo.

 

The reason that the sheriff is enforcing the orders is because they are not void, but were merely voidable.  A legally erroneous order is merely voidable.  If the order is void on its face, the sheriff can and should refuse to enforce the order.

 

Do you really think that an order fo ejectment issued in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in respect of a property physically situated in Hamilton County would be a valid order binding upon the Hamilton County Sheriff?  Such an order would cry out from its face its invalidity.

 

By contrast, your assertion that an order from a court where a plaintiff lacked standing was void ab intitio is simply absurd.  Rather than advancing the interests of foreclosure defense advocates, the arguments you present undermine foreclosure defense because they waste energy and credibility better expended upon valid legal arguments.   

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Martin

Quote:
JUST A FOOTNOTE....A SHERIFF THAT IS AUTHORIZED BY A COURT ORDER TO EVICT HAS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. HIS AGENTS (HIS DEPUTIES OR HIS EVICTION COMPANY) ENJOY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.

A SHERIFF HAS NO BASIS FOR REFUSING TO EXECUTE A JUDGMENT ORDERING EVICTION OTHER THAN A REASON FOR BEING ADVISED OF A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE JUDGMENT (WHETHER VOID OR VOIDABLE ...IT MATTERS NOT TO HIM). IT IS HIS DUTY TO EXECUTE THE ORDER. A FAILURE TO EXECUTE SUCH ORDER MAY RENDER HIM LIABLE SHOULD THE STATE'S ATTORNEY BRING A FORMAL CHARGE OF CONTEMPT OF COURT IN HIS FAILURE TO EXECUTE THE ORDER.
 

And suppose that I bring your Ohio county sheriff an order of ejectment from a Utah court?  Should the sheriff hop into action to enforce such a clearly void order or can he safely ignore it.

 

You need to learn how to turn off the CAPS LOCK button.  You can neither type nor argue a point so it is hardly surprising that you continue to LOSE in court.

 

If, instead of ranting, you took the time to read and understand the law you might actually have a chance of prevailing.  But you seem to simply like to hear yourself talk (or see yourself write) rather than reading what others have posted.

 

It is bad enough that your deficits result in the loss of your own property.  Must you bring about the premature loss of the properties of others by your foolish adherence to legally and morally bankrupt ideas and arguments?  

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BISHOP
EARTH TO MARTIN

THE FOREGOING IS THE WAY THINGS ARE ...THEY ARE NOT MY IDEAS...THEY ARE FACTS AS ESTABLISHED IN ALL STATES BY THE LAWS ENACTED THERE.

MORALLY BANKRUPT IS NOT EVEN CLOSE.

MY MESSAGES ONCE AGAIN ARE TO URGE TAKING ACTION IN THE COURTS TO ATTACK THE VALIDITY OF A "VOID" JUDGMENT SO THAT PEOPLE ARE NOT EVICTED FOR HAVING FAILED TO TAKE ACTION...IN THE COURTS.

MARTIN, WHAT IF THE EVICTION NOTICE IS FROM MARS??? LET ME KNOW THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS LOCATED THERE. PLEASE RESEARCH THAT AND GET BACK TO ME.
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