Mortgage Servicing Fraud
occurs post loan origination when mortgage servicers use false statements and book-keeping entries, fabricated assignments, forged signatures and utter counterfeit intangible Notes to take a homeowner's property and equity.
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homeowner
Hello and thanks to all for all the useful info on this site. Our foreclosure was recently voluntarily dismissed w/o prejudice by plaintiff. I know that in Ohio, they have one year to refile. My question is: " Does the clock start on the filing of the foreclosure complaint or the filing of the dismissal?  Thanks and good luck to you all!
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Digger
Statute begins on the date they filed the dismissal.
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homeowner

Thanks Digger!

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William A. Roper, Jr.
I suspect that someone is confusing a couple of different limitations.  The statute of limitations with respect to negotiable instruments is generally SIX YEARS from the date of acceleration.  See:

1303.16 Statute of limitations - UCC 3-118.

http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/1303.16

 

If there is some other limitation period associated with refiling previously filed actions, I am unaware of what that is or where to find it.  Perhaps Digger can clarify and furnish authority for the assertion that some one year limit exists.

 

Note that IF an instrument was properly accelerated, this would seem to BEGIN the limitations period.  If the WRONG plaintiff then filed suit, it is unclear to me whether this would create ANY obstacle to the correct holder bringing an action within the limitations period.  Moreover, it seems plausible that a mortgage investor could negotiate the instrument to some other entity which might bring a valid action within the limitations period. 

 

It would be better if those asserting what they believe the law to be would include some express citation of authority, prefereably with a LINK to the source so that the assertion might bear verification.

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We will submit this issue to a couple attorneys and report back to this thread/forum. In the meantime we will do our best to keep OHIO updated on breaking - changing - case law. We have a group of foreclosure defense attorneys that and can run anything by them for their opinion along with that of a US BK trustee.

http://ohiofraudclosure.blogspot.com/2011/04/ohio-supreme-court-justices-soon-to.html

William Roper - Your a great man and we will do our part to help!

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Digger
Regaining Possession

Title

Actions to Be Commenced within Ten Years

Author

David L. Ferstendig

Chapter Summary


ABSTRACT TEXT:

This chapter covers CPLR 212, Actions to Be Commenced within Ten Years. It discusses claims that must be asserted within 10 years of the accrual of the cause of action, specifically: (1) actions by any party to regain possession of real property, (2) actions by the state to regain possession of property upon which a letter patent has been annulled, and (3) actions to redeem real property from a mortgage. The chapter discusses the requirement in actions seeking to regain possession of real property that the claimant must establish that it was in possession of the property within the preceding 10 years; it also discusses the similar requirement in actions to redeem real property from a mortgage that the claimant must establish that the mortgagee was in possession for less then 10 years from its breach of the mortgage or from the recording of the deed.

The chapter also defines the term "letter patent" in actions by the state to recover premises upon which a letter patent has been declared annulled. Finally, the chapter explains what constitutes a declaration of annulment.

The chapter includes a historical appendix discussing the amendments and legislative and judicial reports relating to CPLR 212, references to related New York State and federal rules, and law reviews discussing CPLR 212.

New York Civil Practice: CPLR (more commonly known as Weinstein, Korn & Miller) is the leading treatise on New York civil procedure and litigation, and is cited frequently by New York State and Federal courts as the authority on civil practice issues. It provides in-depth analysis and interpretation of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), along with expert guidance and information on common and complex procedural issues facing New York civil law practitioners.

CORE TERMS: 

CPLR 212,Actions Commenced within Ten Years,Ten Years,10-Year Statute,Accrual,Period of Limitation,Statute of Limitations,Regain Possession of Real Property,Recover Real Property,Recover Premises,Ejectment,Action by State,Letter Patent,Redemption of Real Property,Redeem from Mortgage,Breach of Mortgage,Recording of Deed,Declaration of Annulment

RELATED CHAPTERS:

For additional discussion of issues related to limitations of time, see CPLR 211, Actions to Be Commenced within Twenty Years; CPLR 213, Actions to Be Commenced within Six Years: Where Not Otherwise Provided for; On Contract; On Sealed Instrument; On Bond or Note, and Mortgage upon Real Property; By State Based on Misappropriation of Public Property; Based on Mistake; By Corporation against Director, Officer or Stockholder; Based on Fraud; CPLR 213-a, Actions to Be Commenced within Four Years; Residential Rent Overcharge; and CPLR 214, Actions to Be Commenced within Three Years: For Nonpayment of Money Collected on Execution; For Penalty Created by Statute; To Recover Chattel; For Injury to Property; For Personal Injury; For Malpractice Other Than Medical, Dental or Podiatric Malpractice; To Annul a Marriage on the Ground of Fraud.

OTHER RELATED PUBLICATIONS

For forms of defenses and allegations for use in affidavits supporting motions based on CPLR 210, see Bender's Forms for Civil Practice: Civil Litigation, CPLR 2, Limitations of Time (Matthew Bender).

For checklists, practice pointers, and practice insight relating to statutes of limitation generally, seeLexisNexis AnswerGuide New York Civil Litigation, Ch. 4, Statute of Limitations (Matthew Bender).

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Digger

DEFENSE OF PROPERTY

Torts: Intentional Torts: Defenses: Defense of Property

A person who is in lawful possession of real property may use force to protect his or her real property. The person may use force against another person or an intruder if he or she reasonably believes that force is immediately necessary to prevent the other person's trespass on his or her real property. A person who is in lawful possession of tangible personal property may use force against another person in order to prevent the other person's unlawful interference with the personal property.

A person who has been unlawfully dispossessed of his or her real or personal property may use force against another person if he or she reasonably believes that force is immediately necessary to re-enter the real property or to regain possession of the personal property. However, the force must be used immediately after the dispossession. Also, the person must reasonably believe that the other person had no right to dispossess the person of his or her property and the other person must have used force, threats, or fraud to dispossess the person of his or her property.

Even though a person is entitled to use force in defense of his or her property, the person should use other methods to oust another person from his or her real property or to prevent the other person from interfering with his or her personal property. The person should resort to legal process in order to protect his or her real or personal property.

A person is not entitled to use force against another person if the other person is lawfully interfering with the person's real or personal property. If the other person has a right to be on or to use the property, force is never permissible. Also, force may only be used to protect the person's real or personal property.

A person may be entitled to use force against another person in order to protect the property of a third person if the person reasonably believes that the other person's unlawful interference with the third person's property constitutes a theft, if the third person has requested the person to protect the third person's property, or if the person reasonably believes that he or she has a legal duty to protect the third person's property.

A person is only entitled to use deadly force in the defense of his or her property or a third person's property if the person would be entitled to use non-deadly force; if the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the commission of an arson, a burglary, a robbery, or a theft at night; or if the property cannot be protected by any other means. A defendant who is charged with using deadly force to protect property must show that he or she was trying to prevent a certain offense. The defendant's true motive cannot be to kill the other person.

A person is entitled to use a device to protect his or her property if the device is not designed to cause death or serious injury and if the use of the device is reasonable. Examples of such lawful devices include spike fences or barbed wire. Examples of unlawful devices include spring guns and mantraps.

Copyright 2011 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc.

http://www.quicklawoffice.com/Publications/CriminalLawNewsletter.aspx?NewsItemid=5

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Ohio FRAUDclosure emailed two (2) attorneys - from two different OHIO counties -Thanks to OHIO attorney (BB) for the below written emailed answer for William Roper on behalf of  HOMEOWNER

 

Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.19 provides that the Plaintiff has one (1) year from the date of dismissal to re-file the action. below

 

2305.19 Saving in case of reversal.

(A) In any action that is commenced or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, the plaintiff’s representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later. This division applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

 

HOWEVER, most defendants ignore the language “or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.”  If the statute of limitations has expired at the time the case is voluntarily dismissed, THEN the Plaintiff would have one (1) year from the date of the voluntary dismissal to re-file the complaint. 

 

In addition, a foreclosure action is an action upon a written contract.  The statute of limitations on such an action in Ohio is fifteen (15) years.  As such, it is very unlikely that the statute of limitations had expired prior to the date of the voluntary dismissal.  As a result a Plaintiff would have the remaining period of time under the original statute of limitations within which to refile the lawsuit. 

 

A more specific statute of limitations for a claim (for foreclosure) brought pursuant to a negotiable instrument is six (6) years from the date of the acceleration.  R.C. 1303.16(A). 

 

A question would then arise as to whether original suit was brought pursuant to the note (6 years) or if on the mortgage (15 years) based upon the doctrine of merger. (BB)

 

William (& Homeowner) - No specific case law was researched by ohio FRAUDclosure and we relied upon the above email to provide our answer - but it is obvious that a claim must be re-filed ....... in a time that would appear...... to be well after 1 year from the date of the dismissal.

 

http://ohiofraudclosure.blogspot.com/2010/11/ohio-foreclosure-and-fraudclosure.html

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William A. Roper, Jr.
Ohio FRAUDclosure:

That is an interesting proecedural nugget with respect to Ohio law!

I understand from the language of the statute cited and the commentary that in cases properly filed during the limitations period that a reversal or an adverse decision other than on the merits, in Ohio a plaintiff can refile up to one year after the reversal or dismissal without prejudice, even if the limitation period is passed.  This law seems only to enlarge the limitations period and would never reduce it. 

This language does NOT seem to me to anticipate such a refiling where a plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case.  The language states "plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits".  I would NOT see a voluntary dismissal as a "failure".  A plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss for a variety of reasons, including having settled, having erred in bringing the action, etc.  A voluntary dismissal simply means that the plaintiff CHOSE to discontinue the action.

The language would seem to include a dismissal for lack of standing.

I think, though, that the attorney is mistaken in thinking that any theory of merger would extend the limitations period on a promissory note beyond six years.  The negotiable instrument is the evidence of the indebtedness.  The note is the primary thing.  The mortgage is merely a security instrument granting additional security.  Without the note and the debt, there can be no lien.

The idea of a lien extending the note would seem to me to be totally alien to the law of either negotiable instruments or the law of property.  Perhaps there are some cases suggesting otherwise.  But I am pretty doubtful about that.

*

Reading this Section in conjunction with the Ohio UCC, it would seem as though the limitations period runs for six years.  IF a plaintiff files suit within this period and either (a) faces a reversal of a judgment or (b) faces a dismissal without prejudice on a basis other than the merits, the limitations period is further extended, if necessary, to the date one year following dismissal.

*

With the more specific section, we ought to be able to locate some useful cases to help us distinguish.  I am simply giving you a reaction to the analysis furnished!

*

It should be noted for those NOT in Ohio, that we are discussing a limitations rule generally limited to Ohio.  Your jurisidiction MIGHT have some statute, court rule or case law altering the limitations period as it is reflected in the UCC.
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William A. Roper, Jr.
A very quick review of Ohio case law shows that the assertion of Ohio FRAUDclosure's attorney source that a "voluntary dismissal" qualifies under the saving statute seems to be correctMy analysis above to the contrary seems to be in error. 


I found the following authority for BB's assertion within a recent decision of the Court of Appeals:
". . . A plaintiff is permitted to dismiss the claims once pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A) (voluntary dismissal) and, under the savings statute, is permitted to refile them within one year of the dismissal or the expiration of the statute of limitations, whichever is later. R.C. 2305.19(A)."  Stewart v. Forum Health, No. 09-MA-129, 2010 Ohio 4855, 942 N.E.2d 1117 (OH App. 7th 2010).
Footnote 1 to the Ohio Supreme Court case Loudin v. Radiology & Imaging Services, Inc. seems to support the holding of teh Court of Appeals:
"Loudin first filed a complaint on April 14, 2005, but voluntarily dismissed the matter without prejudice on March 16, 2007.  On March 14, 2008, she refiled her complaint as permitted by R.C. 2305.19, which allowed her complaint to stay within the one-year statute of limitations applicable to medical claims under R.C. 2305.113(A)."  Loudin v. Radiology & Imaging Services, Inc., No. 2010-0297, 2011 Ohio 1817, 2011 Ohio LEXIS 965 (Oh. 2011).
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Readers and OHIO litigants,
We cannot stress enough...what a valuable resource and human being Mr. Roper is. Take a look at the extent of his answers AND the level of research. Finally note the time of day in which this man - is participating and working- for YOU! Please support his? - this? site in any way you can. A small take-away from this entire thread (any most others you will read) Now matter what stage of the process you may be in, please seek legal counsel, at some stage. We have seen too many cases lost - not on proper argument or case law - but in a failure to be procedurally correct and/or properly in front of a court. We will be blogging on this exact issue (Friday) as it relates to an upcoming OHIO SUPREME COURT decision (to certify a conflict).

http://ohiofraudclosure.blogspot.com/2011/04/ohio-supreme-court-justices-soon-to.html

Again for all readers and OHIO litigants THANK YOU - William Roper

Respectfully - OhioFRAUDclosure
I'm not an attorney, I am not offering legal advise, I do not represent any company or firm. I am not offering nor recommending any type of loan modification service. OhioFRAUDclosure has established a small network of Attorneys willing to offer information and opinions using OHIO case law, via my blog. They have guided this 4 year legal combatant, through the foreclosure process. I am here to help others similarly situated
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William A. Roper, Jr.
In my post above from 05/04/2011 at 12:41 AM, I speculated about the assertion that the limitations period applicable to written contracts (in respect of a mortgage) might prevail over the limitations period applicable to negotiable instruments:

Quote:
I think, though, that the attorney is mistaken in thinking that any theory of merger would extend the limitations period on a promissory note beyond six years. The negotiable instrument is the evidence of the indebtedness. The note is the primary thing. The mortgage is merely a security instrument granting additional security. Without the note and the debt, there can be no lien.

The idea of a lien extending the note would seem to me to be totally alien to the law of either negotiable instruments or the law of property. Perhaps there are some cases suggesting otherwise. But I am pretty doubtful about that.
 

While I have NOT yet found a case which directly addresses the issue of a possible merger, I have found at least one case which is close.  In that case, a defendant had raised the possibility that a negotiable instrument under the UCC was also a written contract.
""In making the choice between two statutes of limitations applicable to the same conduct, it is settled law that: 'A special statutory provision which relates to the specific subject matter involved in litigation is controlling over a general statutory provision which might otherwise be applicable.'"  Love v. Port Clinton (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99, 524 N.E.2d 166, quoting Andrianos v. Community Traction Co. (1951), 155 Ohio St. 47, 97 N.E.2d 549, paragraph one of the syllabus.

The statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 1303.16(B) specifically applies to demand notes whereas the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.06 applies to contracts in general.  Accordingly, we must conclude that the statute of limitations provided by R.C. 1303.16(B) is controlling in this case and the trial court did not err in so holding. The first assignment of error is not well-taken."
J & A, INC. v. Francis, No. H-03-006, 2004 Ohio 1039; 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 922 (Oh. App. 6th Dist. 2004)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16457739638419014379
*

Also relevant to our inquiry, but not quite precisely on point with respect to merger is another case where a defendant argued that R.C. 2305.06 rather than R.C. 1303.16  should have been applied in respect of the default of a note:
Parmore Group v. G&V Investments, Ltd., Nos. 05AP-756, 06AP-1106, 2006 Ohio 6986 (Oh. App. 10th Dist. 2006)
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16729079954749434470
*

Admittedly, these cases does NOT discuss the concept of merger relating to limitations to apply in respect of two separate instruments.  But I really doubt that the provisions of the general statute relating to the lien is going to prevail.

*

The provisions of R.C. 2305.06 read:
2305.06 Contract in writing.
Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, an action upon a specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought within fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued.
*

If anyone is aware of or finds a case supporting the asserted merger doctrine, please post it and let us know!
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William A. Roper, Jr.
I want to throw out one postscript with respect to the argument that R.C. 2305.06 might apply by merger of the promissory note and deed of trust.

I would point out that neither the promissory note -- a negotiable instrument under the UCC -- OR the mortgage is a contract in the strictest sense.

Each are actually unilateral undertakings.

That is, when you examine a negotiable instrument, it is executed by the maker, but NOT exceteed by the payee or Lender.

Similarly, the mortgage or deed of trust is essentially a unilateral deed of a particular interest in real property.  It is executed by the grantor, known as the mortgagor, in favor of the grantee or mortgagee (this is slightly distorted in MERS instruments).

But the grantee does NOT typically execute this mortgage instrument.

More typical, contracts are bilateral agreements between two or more parties.

I would not only argue that the six (6) year limitations period set forth in the Ohio UCC (R.C. 1303.16) controls, because the lien exists ONLY by virtue of the indebtedness, but I would further argue that the mortgage or deed of trust is not a contract at all in respect of R.C. 2305.06.

I cannot cite any specific Ohio case law in support of this proposition, but I think that it is still a very strong argument.
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FnDoomed
Some fodder for OH researchers:

50 Ohio App. 2d 338, 363 NE 2d 772 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1976 - Google Scholar ... a notarial fee and fees for certificates and recordation in connection with a mortgage by which the ... [20] In Summers the court held that the Statute of Limitations barred a ... share where the setoff was based on a separate transaction involving a promissory note executed between ... Cited by 35 - Related articles

59 Ohio Misc. 13, 391 NE 2d 1047, 7 OO … - Ohio: Court of Common …, 1977 - Google Scholar ... a limited partnership, executed and delivered to The Kissell Company a promissory note in he ... of Woodcrest Association was in connection with the disbursement of the mortgage loan proceeds. ... accrued to the plaintiff, and the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run ... Cited by 16 - Related articles

9 Ohio App. 2d 305, 224 NE 2d 383 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1967 - Google Scholar ... the sum of $3,000 from one Lavern Crider to whom he gave his promissory note, payable in ... loaned $3,000 to the decedent 307 for the purpose of paying the note and mortgage, that no ... of appellant is that the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations (Section 2305.07 ... Cited by 8 - Related articles

114 Ohio App. 3d 401, 683 NE 2d … - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 2nd …, 1996 - Google Scholar ... stated that the Bricklers were delinquent in payments due under the promissory note and set ... and the steps taken by the Bricklers to cancel the mortgage loan transaction. ... motion for summary judgment, arguing that the statute of prescription/statute of limitations distinction relied ... Cited by 19 - Related articles

2008 Ohio 4603 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1st Appellate Dist., 2008 - Google Scholar ... had sold, assigned, transferred, and set over the mortgage deed and promissory note to Wells ... action could cure a real-party-in-interest problem by subsequently obtaining the mortgage. ... case addressing the application of the rule (but in the context of a statute of limitations). ... Cited by 11 - Related articles - All 2 versions

71 Ohio App. 3d 5, 592 NE 2d 908 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1991 - Google Scholar ... Robert Chapman, against defendants-appellees, Malcom Basinger et al., was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. ... brought suit against Ottawa Development Company, Roland Alexander, and Chapman, based upon a mortgage loan promissory note and open ... Cited by 6 - Related articles

90 Ohio App. 3d 584, 630 NE 2d 44 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 11th …, 1993 - Google Scholar ... "5. The court erred in ruling that the appropriate statute of limitations in this ... "12.) The balance due on the promissory note is ordered ... However, the court finds that the instruments * * * (mortgage and note), though poorly drawn, are valid as between [appellant JL Garvey] and the ... Cited by 9 - Related articles

94 Ohio App. 269, 115 NE 2d 48 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1952 - Google Scholar ... v. Firestine, supra, a promissory note with cognovit provisions had been executed in Ohio by two individuals who left ... 11228, General Code), that absence of the defendant from the state would toll the statute of limitations, even in an action in rem to foreclose a mortgage in the ... Cited by 8 - Related articles

159 Ohio App. 3d 608, 2005 Ohio … - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 2nd …, 2005 - Google Scholar ... Instead, the appellees ignored the statute of limitations issue entirely"); Mark-It Place Foods, Inc ... found ABN entitled to summary judgment on the issue of Meyers's default under the promissory note. ... is reversed insofar as it found ABN entitled to foreclose on the mortgage, and the ... Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 2 versions

138 Ohio App. 3d 244, 741 NE 2d … - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 2nd …, 2000 - Google Scholar ... 1995, Brenda Rinzler and Jerald Mayerson signed a five-year $1,350,000 promissory note on behalf ... the partnership needed to raise $2,000,000 to avoid foreclosure, the mortgage holder had ... held that the tangible-personal-property claim was barred by the statute of limitations. ... Cited by 103 - Related articles

2005 Ohio 3727 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 8th Appellate Dist., 2005 - Google Scholar ... the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in RC 1303.16(B). Specifically, Walsh argues that RC 1303.16(B) did not become effective until August 19, 1994, and thus, should not have been retroactively applied to the April 1990 promissory note and January 1991 mortgage deed. ... Cited by 2 - Related articles

2 Ohio Misc. 73, 205 NE 2d 667 - Ohio: Municipal Court, 1964 - Google Scholar ... than was due on the defendant's warrant of attorney contained in the promissory note; that the ... brief and limited it to the two following questions: (1) Does the statute of limitations for vacating ... or assigns who takes goods, chattels, or property, covered by the chattel mortgage out of ... Cited by 3 - Related articles

33 Ohio App. 3d 4, 514 NE 2d 127 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1986 - Google Scholar ... The second mortgage consisted of a promissory note for eleven thousand dollars dated December ... decedent: $1,755.00 for real estate taxes, $100.00 per month for mortgage payments, and ... 2117.12, a statute of limitations of two months is established for prosecution of an action ... Cited by 19 - Related articles

2006 Ohio 3981 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 6th Appellate Dist., 2006 - Google Scholar ... {� 18} The unrefuted combined affidavits of the foreclosure specialist established that appellee is holder of a promissory note executed by appellants and that note and its accompanying mortgage are the subject of this lawsuit. ... Cited by 1 - Related articles

58 Ohio Misc. 5, 388 NE 2d 762 - Ohio: Court of Common Pleas, …, 1978 - Google Scholar ... John M. and Florence McClintock, husband and wife, jointly executed a promissory note in the amount of ... This note was secured by a mortgage on property then jointly owned by the couple. ... the time limits set forth in RC 2117.02 is to establish a statute of limitations, citing Fulton v ... Cited by 2 - Related articles

116 Ohio App. 381, 184 NE 2d 457 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1962 - Google Scholar ... "A judgment was entered against the defendant in favor of Domestic Loan, Inc., by virtue of a warrant of attorney contained in a promissory note on July ... I agree that this revivor shall apply to and cover the obligation incurred under the terms of a note and chattel mortgage which I ... Cited by 5 - Related articles

188 Ohio App. 3d 213, 2010 Ohio … - Ohio: Court of Appeals, …, 2010 - Google Scholar ... which it alleged that it was the owner and holder of the promissory note and corresponding ... Indeed, appellants signed the mortgage documents at the closing and fail to explain why ... 27} Regarding appellants' CSPA claims, appellees argue that the statute of limitations bars such ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions

51 Ohio App. 3d 69, 554 NE 2d 900 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1988 - Google Scholar ... The purchase money mortgage described the collateral as "twenty four (24) Holstein heifers with ... statement constitutes constructive notice so as to trigger the running of the statute of limitations. ... Both Bob and Paul Mikesell signed the promissory note evidencing this obligation. ... Cited by 19 - Related articles

2011 Ohio 314 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1st Appellate Dist., 2011 - Google Scholar ... 2} Winter is the president of Five Star, a licensed mortgage broker and mortgage lender. ... Five Star and Merchant's had entered into a loan agreement and promissory note in which ... note; based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel; based on the statute of limitations; and because ... Related articles

2010 Ohio 5938 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 7th Appellate Dist., 2010 - Google Scholar ... Thus, this action was timely filed even if the negotiable instruments statute of limitations applies. ... 33} "(A) The parties to a bond, bill, promissory note, or other ... a broker or dealer registered under the "Securities Exchange Act of 1934"; (3) the loan is secured by a mortgage or deed ... Related articles

2011 Ohio 1596 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 10th Appellate Dist., 2011 - Google Scholar ... rejected appellant's contention that BAC's action was barred by the six-month statute of limitations specified in RC ... of BAC's action as merely a creditor's claim against an estate on a promissory note. ... a "complaint in foreclosure," in which it sought foreclosure of its mortgage and a ... Related articles

2008 Ohio 893 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 5th Appellate Dist., 2008 - Google Scholar ... On July 26, 2000, the Lannings executed a promissory note to JP Morgan for ... The legal description attached to the mortgage on the Summit County property referenced the ... Lannings' claims for negligence/willful and wanton misconduct were barred by the statute of limitations. ... Related articles

2010 Ohio 4271 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 6th Appellate Dist., 2010 - Google Scholar ... {� 55} Thorne asserts that his claim is still not barred by the statute of limitations because the ... not comport with Civ.R. 56(E) because Ugwuadu's assertion that Residential, through its loan servicing agent, GMAC, has custody of the promissory note and mortgage, was based ... Related articles

111 Ohio App. 463 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1st Appellate Dist., 1960 - Google Scholar ... that defendant's note secured by the mortgage on the property here concerned and also all rights under such mortgage had been ... Such a notation on the back of a promissory note, when used for the purpose of attempting to extend the running of the statute of limitations, is a ... Related articles

2004 Ohio 62 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 10th Appellate Dist., 2004 - Google Scholar ... the note is due "on demand." Dr. Welsh executed a second promissory note in favor of ... behalf of the Estate of Luella Cavin modified the purchase money mortgage counterclaim to ... appellee's execution of two promissory notes) was barred by the statute of limitations and because ... Related articles

118 Ohio App. 371 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 1963 - Google Scholar ... Plaintiffs, appellees herein, seek judgment upon a promissory note for the balance of the purchase price of real estate, and foreclosure of a mortgage securing the note ... Plaintiffs replied, denying fraud and alleging the running of the four-year statute of limitations on a cause of ... Related articles

2010 Ohio 5016 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 8th Appellate Dist., 2010 - Google Scholar ... 2} On April 25, 2007, appellants executed a promissory note and mortgage ... Therefore, changing material terms of the mortgage hours before closing is a violation of Section 1639(b)(1 ... that even if he violated the TILA, appellants TILA claims are barred by the statute of limitations. ... Related articles

2009 Ohio 3848 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 5th Appellate Dist., 2009 - Google Scholar ... rejecting claims that lender had violated RICO and the National Bank Act by issuing loan check in exchange for promissory note, and imposing ... {�51} Appellant argues he rescinded the mortgage loan transaction ... The three year statute of limitations bars the purported recession. ... Related articles

2007 Ohio 6133 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate Dist., 2007 - Google Scholar ... v. Francis, Huron App. No. H-03-006, 2004-Ohio-1039, that the specific statute of limitations in RC 1303.16(B) would apply in a mortgage foreclosure action based on a promissory note, rather than the fifteen-year statute of limitations for written contracts. Id. at at � 17-18. ... Related articles

2005 Ohio 682 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 12th Appellate Dist., 2005 - Google Scholar ... at 255; and Bradfield, 67 Ohio St. at 322-323. Parenthetically, we note that this is an unusual case in that, in most instances, the debt secured by the mortgage will often be a promissory note, which, as a written contract, has a 15-year statute of limitations. RC 2305.06. ... Related articles

2009 Ohio 1303 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 3rd Appellate Dist., 2009 - Google Scholar ... As previously stated, all of the cashier's checks from 1999-2001 are barred by the statute of limitations, and WOCRA cannot maintain an ... applied to and paid off the balance of the loan, and as a result, First Financial cancelled the promissory note and mortgage that Fast had ... Related articles

2005 Ohio 2105 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 6th Appellate Dist., 2005 - Google Scholar ... To secure payment of the promissory note, Trombley executed and delivered to Wesson a mortgage deed on the ... that: (1) Trombley's claim of legal malpractice against the appellee firm relating to attorney Groth's conduct was barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Trombley ... Related articles
2007 Ohio 3584 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate Dist., 2007 - Google Scholar ... Jones alleged that the Gayharts had defaulted on a promissory note in the amount of $50,000 secured by a mortgage on the ... R. 60(B)(5) because the claim on the note is barred by the statute of limitations, because Jones and his siblings abandoned their right to collect on ... Related articles

2004 Ohio 6967 - Ohio: Court of Appeals, 5th Appellate Dist., 2004 - Google Scholar ... a fully executed loan document, signed by the debtor, and subject to a four year statute of limitations. ... In Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation v. Locker, Montgomery App ... to RC1335.02(B) a loan agreement does not include a promise, promissory note, agreement, ... Related articles



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