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JJ
And here I thought that I would hang on to my standing argument until an opportune time, not so fast in Florida.  Although in many other states standing is in fact recognized as subject matter jurisdiction.

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16722561931941134720&q=%22subject+matter+jurisdiction%22+and+%22standing%22&hl=en&as_sdt=4,10&as_ylo=2010

The petitioner relies on language contained in Askew v. Hold The Bulkhead-Save Our Bays, Inc., 269 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) ("Standing has been equated with jurisdiction of the subject matter of litigation...."). We do not agree that a circuit court that otherwise had jurisdiction over the subject matter, i.e., "the general power of the court over the case," would lose such jurisdiction because the plaintiff may lack standing. McGhee, 974 So.2d at 525-26.

It appears in Florida, that pleading "plaintiff lacks standing" is virtually equivalent to pleading that "plaintiff is not the real party in interest".  Both are defenses to a complaint and not affirmative defenses.

I know there must be a distinction between the 2 arguments.  However, I am struggling to develop an analogy that cleary demonstrates their differences, and subsequently wrap my head around the proper approach to articulate an argument for each defense.

Thoughts?
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iknow
Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, should clarify this for you.

http://www.leagle.com/decision/19851640462So2d1178_11366


We begin with some observations about the relationship between the overlapping but theoretically separate concepts of "standing" and "real party in interest." See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1542 (1971). In its broadest sense, standing is no more than having, or representing one who has, "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."[3] Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 (1972). See Gieger v. Sun First National Bank of Orlando, 427 So.2d 815 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Argonaut Insurance Co. v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co., 380 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 2d 1183*1183 DCA), rev. denied, 389 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 1980). Under this definition, it can hardly be doubted that Kumar, which under its agreement with Nava was not to be paid until Nava actually sold the merchandise in Venezuela and would thus suffer a loss of $144,417.00 if its suit does not succeed, has a sufficient stake in the outcome of an otherwise justiciable controversy so as to have standing.[4] See Levatino Co. v. M/S Helvig Torm, 295 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

However, standing encompasses not only this "sufficient stake" definition, but the at least equally-important requirement that the claim be brought by or on behalf of one who is recognized in the law as a "real party in interest," that is, "the person in whom rests, by substantive law, the claim sought to be enforced," Author's Comment to Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.210, 30 Fla. Stat. Ann. 304, 306-07 (1967); see 3A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 17.02 (2d ed. 1984). The basic purpose of rules requiring that every action be prosecuted by or on behalf of the real party in interest is merely "to protect a defendant from facing a subsequent similar action brought by one not a party to the present proceeding and to ensure that any action taken to judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata... ." Prevor-Mayorsohn Caribbean, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 620 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1980). The Florida real party in interest rule, Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.210(a), permits an action to be prosecuted in the name of someone other than, but acting for, the real party in interest.[5] See Durrant v. Dayton, 396 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); 39 Fla.Jur.2d Parties, § 9 (1982); see also Thomas v. Martin, 100 Fla. 146, 129 So. 602 (1930) (real party in interest may bring suit in name of nominal party); Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. v. Concrete Equipment, Inc., 394 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 402 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1981). Thus, where a plaintiff is either the real party in interest or is maintaining the action on behalf of the real party in interest, its action cannot be terminated on the ground that it lacks standing.



"Between two evils, I always pick the one I never tried before."

-Mae West
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JJ
Thanks iknow, I never thought to look at real party in interest as an element of standing. 

In its broadest sense, standing is no more than having, or representing one who has, "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."[3] Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 (1972).

Am I going crazy, or does the highlighted quote from the opinion in fact say that standing is an element of subject matter jurisdiction?

I'm not sure how it is in other states, but FL is all over the place in its opinions.

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iknow
JJ wrote:
Thanks iknow, I never thought to look at real party in interest as an element of standing. 

In its broadest sense, standing is no more than having, or representing one who has, "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."[3] Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 (1972).

Am I going crazy, or does the highlighted quote from the opinion in fact say that standing is an element of subject matter jurisdiction?

I'm not sure how it is in other states, but FL is all over the place in its opinions.



You are facing the same problem everyone faces.  Bad lawyers/briefs make bad case law.  It's not that their opinions are all over the place, its that someone will often use an incorrect term and the court of appeals doesn't correct it. 

A common example is that Conditions Precedent is an affirmative defense.  With an affirmative defense the defendant has the burden of proof.  Clearly, you don't have to prove the Plaintiff complied with conditions, THEY have the burden of proof, but we still see decision saying it's an affirmative defense.  If you actually READ the cases, this becomes very clear that it is not an affirmative defense.


As far the above quote concerning standing/subject matter jurisdiction, I don't see where it goes into subject matter jurisdiction at all. 

What it is saying is you need to have a dog in the fight.

In order to go to court, you have to have been injured before the court can decide the issue.

If the trust never had the note and cannot enforce the note, it doesn't matter if you defaulted, they don't have an interest in note (sufficient stake), and have not been injured by your default (justiciable controversy [wink] , so if they sue you there is nothing for the court to really decide ( judicial resolution of that controversy). 

They lack standing to complain about he breech so there is nothing for the court to decide.

"Between two evils, I always pick the one I never tried before."

-Mae West
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JJ
After some additional research, I believe that Florida has it right and the several other states that subscribe to standing is subject matter jurisdiction are incorrect (although I wish it were the other way around.)

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In order to go to court, you have to have been injured before the court can decide the issue.


I was always under the impression that the injury begat the sufficient stake in the outcome (standing), which then allowed the court to hear the issue (subject matter).

It appears a number of states interpret standing the same way:

If a court determines a party lacks standing, it "must dismiss the case because it does not have jurisdiction of the substantive issues presented." Id. (citing State ex rel. Ryan v. Carnahan, 960 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Mo.App. E.D. 1998); Rule 55.27(g)(3)).

standing is a "jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or the Court at any time." City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2000) (citing Williams v. Stevens, 390 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Miss. 1980)).P23.

If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the action. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994).

"When a party without standing purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter jurisdiction." State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999).

There are a number of other states that follow this exact reasoning.

However, I recently ran across a couple definitions of subject matter jurisdiction:

Subject-matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. For instance, bankruptcy court only has the authority to hear bankruptcy cases.

AND

The first and most fundamental requirement is subject matter jurisdiction (SMJ). A court’s power derives from either constitutional or statutory provisions specifying the class of cases the court is granted authority to hear.9 It has SMJ only over those types of cases, and may not proceed in any fashion in any other type of case.

So it's as simple as that.  In Florida, do not waive your standing argument by failing to make it at the proper time.
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iknow
So true.

Being in FL you may find some of these cases helpful in case you have not come across them.

http://www.icelegal.com/files/Foreclosure_Cases_website.pdf
"Between two evils, I always pick the one I never tried before."

-Mae West
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JJ

Well, again after some additional research, it seems that the FL Supreme Court thinks otherwise and agrees with the opinion of many of the other states:

"The determination of standing to sue concerns a court's exercise of jurisdiction to hear and decide the cause pled by a particular party. Generally, one with a legally protectible right or interest at stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy is a proper party to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."
Rogers & Ford Const. v. Carlandia Corp., 626 So. 2d 1350 - Fla: Supreme Court 1993

In view of this of this opinion, and in consideration of Fla.R.Civ.P 1.140 (h)(2) which states:

The defenses of failure to state a cause of action or a legal defense or to join an indispensable party may be raised by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits in addition to being raised either in a motion under subdivision (b) or in the answer or reply. The defense of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any time.

One would think they could preserve their standing argument for an opportune time as I did (specifically standing at inception), however I have decided to err on the side of caution and present mine by way of MTD and, if required, my answer.  As I originally hoped though, I will hold onto my "plaintiff lacked standing at inception" argument as long as possible for use at an opportune time.

Also, thanks iknow for sharing that link, there were a few cases listed that I had not yet run into.

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