Mortgage Servicing Fraud
occurs post loan origination when mortgage servicers use false statements and book-keeping entries, fabricated assignments, forged signatures and utter counterfeit intangible Notes to take a homeowner's property and equity.
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t

The Idaho Supreme Court handed down a substitute opinion (withdrawing its prior January 25, 2012, decision) in the case Trotter v. BNY as trustee for the CWALT, Inc Alternative Loan Trust 2005-28CB:

 

Trotter v. BNY as trustee for the CWALT, Inc Alternative Loan Trust 2005-28CB, No. 38022 (Idaho 2012) 

http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/TROTTER%20-%20SUB.pdf

 

The decision will come as no surprise to those following Mr. Roper's posts over the years.  The court held precisely as Mr. Roper tells us it should.

 

Plaintiff-Appellant Vermont Trotter brought a case against Bank of New York in Idaho Court.  Idaho is a non-judicial foreclosure state.  Within his allegations, Mr. Trotter alleged that BNY lacked standing to foreclose.

 

The Idaho Supreme Court tells us:

 

"Trotter argues that before a party may foreclose under the Act, it must establish its standing to foreclose by proving that it is the current owner of the note and mortgage. At oral argument before this Court, Trotter also suggested that a trustee may not initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under the Act unless it has authorization from the beneficiary.  We disagree.  While it is true that a party must have standing before it may invoke the jurisdiction of a court, the foreclosure process in the Act is not a judicial proceeding.  Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 46 n.1, 137 P.3d 429, 433 n.1 (2006).  Instead, “[t]he procedures to foreclose on trust deeds outside of the judicial process provide the express-lane alternative to foreclosure in the judicial system and strip borrowers of protections embedded in a judicial foreclosure.”  Id.  Thus, as an “alternative” that is “outside the judicial process,” the Act sets forth all of the requirements to foreclose on a deed of trust.

Compare what Mr. Roper taught us in this post from 2008:

 

Quote:
Standing is an Issue in a Judicial Foreclosure Setting

IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT FOLKS UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUE OF STANDING APPLIES IN THE INSTANCE OF JUDICIAL FORECLOSURES. IN NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE STATES, WHERE A FORECLOSURE IS BY PRIVATE POWER OF SALE PURSUANT TO A DEED OF TRUST, THE MORTGAGE INVESTOR IS NOT SEEKING TO INVOKE THE AUTHORITY AND POWER OF THE COURTS, SO STANDING IS NOT AN IMPEDIMENT. THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE DEFENSES IN THESE STATES, BUT STANDING IS NOT THE CENTRAL DEFENSE.

This brings us back to Moose's ongoing admonition that it is ESSENTIAL that you get good, competent legal counsel!

Hopping on this forum the night before a Court appearance and asking for advice without even identifying your STATE and failing to include critical details of your situation and case is a prescription for disaster!

 

Mr. Roper's post of 01/29/08 at 03:29 AM within thread "MERS Info needed" 

http://ssgoldstar.websitetoolbox.com/post/show_single_post?pid=23501372&postcount=13

 

Similarly:

 

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It is my understanding that Alabama is a non-judicial foreclosure state. Consequently, usually a foreclosure is accomplished by private power of sale pursuant to a deed of trust.

When we have discussed standing as an issue, we are talking about a plaintiff's entitlement to use the courts to seek a remedy. Non-judicial foreclosure does NOT typically involve use of the courts to acquire title to a property. Consequently, standing is NOT a core defense in a non-judicial foreclosure setting.

Typically, post-foreclosure, the BUYER at the non-judicial private sale uses an ejectment action to eject -- similar to eviction -- the owner from his or her home. Perhaps you are now facing an ejectment action.

There ARE some viable defenses in a non-judicial foreclosure and issues which can be raised in an ejectment proceeding. Most of these relate to the regularity of the private sale and the validity of the deed given by the trustee.

I HOPE YOU HAVE A VERY GOOD ATTORNEY! YOU NEED GOOD REPRESENTATION, A STRONG DEFENSIVE PLEADING, AND PROPER PREPARATION IDENTIFYING THE DEFECTS IN THE PRIVATE SALE IN ORDER TO HAVE MUCH CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING IN THIS SORT OF PROCEEDING.

THERE IS VERY LITTLE THAT PEOPLE ON A THIS MESSAGE BOARD CAN DO TO HELP YOU AT THIS LATE HOUR! BEST OF LUCK!

Mr. Roper's post of 01/29/08 at 12:50 AM within thread "Suit claims Fidelity abuses homeowners"
http://ssgoldstar.websitetoolbox.com/post/show_single_post?pid=23499158&postcount=21

 

These are merely two of hundreds of posts by Mr. Roper on this subject.

 

Swindlers have been propagating the MYTH that a standing defense can be raised in non-judicial states.  This myth helps support the sales of millions of dollars in scam forensic loan audits and mortgage securitization audits.

 

The Idaho Supreme Court also briefly addresses and dismisses another argument that the swindlers are also using as a pretext for their debt elimination scams.  This is the false argument that a borrower might be absolved of responsibility for the debt by the payment of some insurance claim or other default risk arbitrage technique.

 

Here at the Forum, Mr. Roper and more recently others, including myself, have repeatedly challenged the swindlers to identify any statutory basis or case law supporting their absurd arguments.  Of course, there is never any actual case law support.  Proponents of this nonsense simply quote other swindlers, such as Neil Garfield, in support of these vacuous arguments.

 

The reason to ask for support for their propositions, is that absent some statute or case law to support their argument, the argument simply fails.

 

Here is what the Idaho Supreme Court had to say:

"Trotter’s arguments that (a) MERS had no authority to assign the deed of trust to Bank of New York, and (b) his loan obligation may have been satisfied by an insurance policy, thereby precluding foreclosure, are not supported with relevant legal authority.

 

The Idaho Appellate Rules require an appellant to support its contentions “with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6).  Thus, it is “well settled” that an issue on appeal will not be considered if it is “not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument.”  Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 376, 973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).  Even where an issue is “explicitly set forth in the party’s brief” as one of the bases for appeal, if it is “only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.”  Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382-83, 234 P.3d 699, 706-07 (2010) (citing Inama v. Boise Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Comm’rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003)).

 

. . .

 

Trotter also mentions in his initial brief that summary judgment was not appropriate because his loan obligation may have been satisfied by insurance payments after it was securitized and placed in a mortgage loan trust.  In support of this assertion of error, Trotter cites no legal authority, but instead refers the Court to the allegations in his original complaint. This is insufficient to satisfy I.A.R. 35(a)(6).  Because he mentions this argument only in passing and without supporting argument or authority, the argument is waived and we decline to consider it."

The insurance argument has no legal merit whatsoever.  Swindler Neil Garfield is a major proponent of this idiotic argument.  He uses it to support his sales of forensic loan audits and mortgage securitization audits, as well as to profit from referral of distressed borrowers to other crooked attorneys in his syndicate.

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Walt

t seems to have forgotten that we already had a very nice thread on the Trotter decision when the original opinion was handed down by the Idaho Supreme Court in January.  The thread was started by f, who has been absent from the Forum recently:

 

Specious Swindler's Argument About Loans Paid By Insurance Proceeds: Trotter v. BNY Mellon

http://ssgoldstar.websitetoolbox.com/post?id=5688301

 

I will add a cross-link to the other thread, as well.

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Walt

Perhaps someone can lay the original and the substitute opinion side by side and alert the Forum to the differences between these two decisions.

 

I do not have the time or the energy to do this tonight.

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CWW
First of all i have to agree with the courts decision.  The way Trotter plead the case prob. gave the court no choice. Alltho  I would have to say it seems so wrong that a company foreclosing at all , would not have to have standing.   But I have a different question  since the posters on this topic know about non-judicial foreclosure in Idaho.   I believe the statutes say that a substitute trustee can be appointed, as long as the substitute trustee is not the beneficiary.   In the many cases were MERS assigns the deed and the note, (even tho they do not own the note), to Bank of America and then Bank of America  appoints Recontrust as the substitute trustee, Recontrust is in fact Bank of America.  Does this seem right ?
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Leo

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First of all i have to agree with the courts decision. The way Trotter plead the case prob. gave the court no choice. Alltho I would have to say it seems so wrong that a company foreclosing at all , would not have to have standing.
 

 

cww:

 

I think that you are missing something here and suggest that you follow the link to the prior thread discussing the original Trotter decision in January.

 

Those participating in these threads are not saying that a defendant does not have a possibly valid argument relating to whether the entity seeking to foreclose has the power and authority to do so.

 

The Supreme Courts in Massachusetts and Nevada have expressly held that when an entity lacks any interest in the security instrument that it cannot conduct a valid sale.

 

But this is not so because the purported mortgage investor lacked standingStanding is unnecessary to a private sale because there is no court involved.  In Ibanez, the court recognized that there was a later standing issue when the purported purchaser at the private sale sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.  The standing problem arose because the deed under which the plaintiff claimed ownership was a nullity due to the failure to follow the requisite procedure.

 

Trotter's problem is not an unsympathetic court in Idaho.  Trotter's problem is that Trotter made the wrong argument.

 

But Trotter made the argument that the buffoon of an attorney running one of the very largest debt elimination scam swindles in the nation recommended to Trotter and then celebrated at his own web pages.  Trotter was led to slaughter by swindlers!

 

Whether a distressed borrower in a non-judicial foreclosure state can ultimately prevail remains doubtful.  But this in not because an initial foreclosure might not be successfully attacked and set aside.  The larger problem is that where the original private sale was defective, the purported mortgage investor will simply conduct another private sale.  With non-judicial foreclosures, the servicer can redo the sale over and over and over until they finally get it right!  There is no res judicata as would apply in a judicial foreclosure state where a lender loses a foreclosure case and then is precluded from re-litigating.

 

There is only one generally effective means of delaying or stopping a foreclosure in non-judicial foreclosure states and that is bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy is not going to be a viable or effective solution for everyone.  And depending upon the facts, sometimes it is better to just let the property go and file for bankruptcy afterwards.

 

Here is the bottom line.  Trotter is a victim of the swindlers and their false myths and false strategies.  Trotter carried forward to arguments suggested by the swindlers and had his a$$ handed to him by the Idaho Supreme Court.

 

The Idaho Supreme Court ruled correctly.  Trotter didn't have  a case.  Trotter never had a case because Trotter was being coached by swindlers whose only interest was in reaching into his pockets and separate him from his very last dollar before he lost his final appeal. 

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John Lewis

Quoe Walt: "Perhaps someone can lay the original and the substitute opinion side by side and alert the Forum to the differences between these two decisions."

 

***************************

January 25, 2012:

pg 8:

 

C. Bank of New York is entitled to attorney fees.

Under I.C. § 12-121, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees "when this Court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."

Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428, 438 (2004); I.R.C.P 54(e)(1). Here, Bank of New York is the prevailing party and Trotter’s arguments were not supported by relevant authority. He cited neither Idaho cases related to the Deed of Trust Act nor persuasive authority that addresses analogous issues, instead relying on cases applicable to judicial proceedings and thus irrelevant to the dispute before us. As such, his appeal was without foundation. Therefore, we award Bank of New York costs and attorney fees.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s orders granting Bank of New York’s motion to dismiss and denying Trotter’s motion to compel. Costs and attorney fees on appeal to Bank of New York.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES

CONCUR

 

 

*************************************

March 23, 2012:

p 8:

 

C. Neither party is entitled to an award of attorney fees.

Under I.C. § 12-121, the prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees "when this Court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."

Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 P.3d 428, 438 (2004); I.R.C.P 54(e)(1). Here, Trotter did not prevail and is therefore not entitled to an award of attorney fees. Although Bank of New York is the prevailing party, we conclude that Trotter has presented argument on an issue of first impression. Accordingly, we decline to award Bank of New York attorney fees on appeal. Taylor v. AIA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, ___, 261 P.3d 829, 851 (2011) (citing Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 651, 115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005)).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s orders granting Bank of New York’s motion to dismiss and denying Trotter’s motion to compel. Costs, but not attorney fees, to Bank of New York.

Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES

CONCUR.

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cww

But I have a different question  since the posters on this topic know about non-judicial foreclosure in Idaho.   I believe the statutes say that a substitute trustee can be appointed, as long as the substitute trustee is not the beneficiary.   In the many cases were MERS assigns the deed and the note, (even tho they do not own the note), to Bank of America and then Bank of America  appoints Recontrust as the substitute trustee, Recontrust is in fact Bank of America.  Does this seem right ?

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Walt

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But I have a different question since the posters on this topic know about non-judicial foreclosure in Idaho. I believe the statutes say that a substitute trustee can be appointed, as long as the substitute trustee is not the beneficiary. In the many cases were MERS assigns the deed and the note, (even tho they do not own the note), to Bank of America and then Bank of America appoints Recontrust as the substitute trustee, Recontrust is in fact Bank of America. Does this seem right ?
  

Recontrust is a separate and distinct legal entity from BAC.  Whether using an affiliated or wholly owned corporation as the substitute trustee is ethical is a different question than whether use of such an entity is legal.

 

In general, I think that the first threshold that a distressed borrower needs to demonstrate is that there was some irregularity or mischief associated with the private sale under the deed of trust.

 

If no irregularity or mischief can be shown and proven, then it is unclear to me whether the use of the affiliate is going to be an issue.  By contrast, if some irregularity can be demonstrated, then the fact of the affiliation might make it somewhat easier to make out a case that the mischief has been orchestrated by BAC, etc.

 

In the end, what difference do you really think it makes if the substitute trustee is a corporate entity owned by BAC rather than individual attorneys employed by a foreclosure mill law firm engaged by BAC?

 

I think that you are fixated on an imagined issue.  You need to refocus on conformity of the sale to the law and the contractual provisions of the deed of trust.

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cww

Yes there are other irregularities. But to answer the question of what difference does it make.   It is a matter of what the law meant when it said that the substitute trustee can not be the beneficiary.   They must have wrote the statute for a reason.  When else would a trustee be the beneficiary?  Other than the trustee being a part of the same company as the beneficiary.

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Walt

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Yes there are other irregularities. But to answer the question of what difference does it make. It is a matter of what the law meant when it said that the substitute trustee can not be the beneficiary. They must have wrote the statute for a reason. When else would a trustee be the beneficiary? Other than the trustee being a part of the same company as the beneficiary.

 

Under corporation laws everywhere, each corporation is treated as a separate and distinct entity, even when these entities are commonly owned or own one another.  Therefore, it is difficult to to ascribe the activities of one, legal to another.

 

There are exceptions to this general rule, both statutory and legal.  For example, provisions of the tax code or accounting rules may allow for or even require that the entities be treated as one for tax purposes, or for preparation of consolidated accounting statements.  Or, where it can be shown that one or more of the corporations has failed to operate separately or to ignore the legal fiction of separation, then sometimes a party can pierce the corporate veil and hold shareholders, officers and directors liable for the debts or misdeeds of a poorer or thinly capitalized associate.

 

This is not usually easy to do.  Where the companies have been operated as separate and distinct entities following the general corporation laws, this can be next to impossible.

 

It seems to me that you are seizing on an arcane and emotional point and trying to surmount almost impossible obstacles.

 

If you can show deviation from the law and/or the requirements for judicial sale in the sale under the private power, this can be enough without shouldering even greater burdens.  It seems to me that attacking common ownership adds nothing and just makes your burdens more difficult.

 

In the end, the problem with any attack on the mechanics of the private sale is the mortgage investor will take everything that you teach them about the defects and simply repair these in a subsequent corrective sale.  So that all that can usually be accomplished in an ordinary case is delay rather than stopping a sale altogether. 

 

If you drink the "Quiet Title Koolaid" you are even worse off, because this is essentially an impossibility and simply a vacuous strategy founded upon a myth devised by the swindlers as a pretext for their debt elimination scams.

 

The most interesting unexplored avenue is that described by Mr. Roper involving a strategic retreat and later reassertion of rights in respect of a defective private sale after the limitations period to enforce the deed of trust has already passed.  This probably wouldn't work everywhere.  Its efficacy would depend upon the specific wording of a state's laws on private sale, as well as the unique facts of the case.  Mr. Roper also carefully explained that he was unaware of anyone who had ever used the strategy nor anyone who had succeeded.  But it appeared to have greater promise than anything else identified or devised by the swindlers and has the appeal of simplicity and conformity with basic legal principles (subject to the arcane special provisions of a particular state's laws). 

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Vermontt
I am Trotter in Trotter v. BONY.

It is clear from reading this thread that you are operating on incomplete information.

I was a scammed by a debt elimination swindler?  I don't know.  If I was,  I wish someone would tell me who?

Here is a brief consolidation of the question before the court:  Did the trial court err in granting a motion for summary judgement as opposed to granting a motion to compel discovery?

There are a lot of things in this ruling which are quite disturbing especially if you are familiar with all of the facts of the case which,  from the reading in this thread,  you are not.  That's fine.

The thing I find most disturbing is that their ruling indicates that in Idaho,  there is no need to demonstrate beneficial interest in order to avail ones self of the non-judicial foreclosure statutes 45-1502 et. seq.

So to me what that means is that if you have the balls to file the docs,  anyone can foreclose on anyone and given that the local County Prosecutor,  Barry McHugh refuses to prosecute my felony complaints,  looks to me like a pretty safe crime.

But here is a little factoid all of you missed.  The court declined to review the bulk of my arguments.  What were those arguments?  You start digging into those and you begin to see just how many hoops these guys jumped through in order to get to where they are.

It's ugly,  but as a good friend of mine always tells me,  "Until the man in the black dress drops a hammer and says it is so,  it ain't so and everything else is merely argument of counsel".

Plenty of fight left in this guy and plenty of ways to jam a cork into them in Idaho.  All is not lost.  As I said to the court when I opened oral arguments,  "If we knew then what we know now". 

Ain't it the truth,  ain't it the truth.

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Walt

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I was a scammed by a debt elimination swindler? I don't know. If I was, I wish someone would tell me who?
 

 

Whether you were directly scammed and harmed by paying a scam artist or a swindler or whether you were indirectly scammed by being misled into making vacuous arguments for which there exists no valid support in the law is of little moment.

 

The arguments identified in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision as forming the basis for your appeal shows that you were making legally incorrect and unsupportable arguments.

 

If you believe that the Idaho Supreme Court has misstated or falsely represented your arguments, why don't you post your appellate brief on Scribd and then post a link here.

 

I will take a look, but I am not optimistic.  The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court appears to be thoughtful, well reasoned and consistent with the law almost everywhere.  You seemed to seize upon specious arguments rather than valid arguments.

 

If you can find fault with any of the analysis posted by others in these two threads, feel free to share it.  Simply stating that those discussing this case have incomplete facts or misapprehend the arguments is insufficient.  If this reflects the limits of your ability to set forth your argument it is little wonder that you lost.

 

Quote:
The thing I find most disturbing is that their ruling indicates that in Idaho, there is no need to demonstrate beneficial interest in order to avail ones self of the non-judicial foreclosure statutes 45-1502 et. seq.

 

The decision doesn't seem to actually say that.  Instead, the decision seems to show that you used the incorrect argument.  In a non-judicial foreclosure state, when a distress borrower brings an action as the plaintiff, standing is never a valid issue.  Not in Idaho.  NOT ANYWHERE.

 

If you have spent a fraction of the time here at the MS Fraud Forum scrutinizing Mr. Roper's useful posts, rather than downloading arguments and pleadings from the web sites of swindlers and scam artists, then you would have already known that!

 

In all likelihood, you do not even realize which of the sites are being operated by swindlers.  The issue is NOT that you haven't been deceived and harmed, but that you have not yet fully appreciated and perceived that you defeat is your own fault for putting forward these vacuous arguments promoted by the swindlers.

 

Quote:
But here is a little factoid all of you missed. The court declined to review the bulk of my arguments. What were those arguments? You start digging into those and you begin to see just how many hoops these guys jumped through in order to get to where they are.

 

Since you fail to identify these arguments, we must trust the thoughtful decision of the Idaho Supreme Court.  If you failed to make these arguments before the trial court, then you were probably not entitled to make the arguments for the first time on appeal.  If you made arguments, but failed to properly support these arguments with appropriate authority, then the Idaho Supreme Court was correct in declining to review the arguments.  If you failed to cite to the record to show where you made this argument in your case in the trial court, then the Supreme Court was also correct in declining to review the argument.

 

In short, if you want to re-argue your case before the seniors art the Forum, then by all means post your brief, as well as the underlying record from the trial court.

 

I, for one, am unsympathetic.  It seems to me that you relied upon failed and meritless arguments and got shot down by both the trial court and the Supreme Court.  Rather than advancing the cause of foreclosure defense, you have simply set things back, because instead of showing the way with correct arguments, you instead created more case law helpful to plaintiffs which can now be used to harm other borrowers who misunderstand, misconstrue or otherwise fail to perceive the distinctions. 

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CWW
Walt , thank you so much for addressing my question.  I will end my part of this thread as I see that the original part of it is not finished.  To put my question to rest could you please just give me an example of who or what you think would be, a trustee that IS the beneficiary,. that the statute was talking about.   Again the statute says that there can be a substitute trustee as long as the substitute trustee is not the beneficiary.
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Walt

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To put my question to rest could you please just give me an example of who or what you think would be, a trustee that IS the beneficiary,. that the statute was talking about. Again the statute says that there can be a substitute trustee as long as the substitute trustee is not the beneficiary.

 

Suppose that A borrows money from B giving in return a promissory note and dead of trust.  The original deed of trust names B as the beneficiary and C as the trustee.  Later, B negotiates the note and assigns the deed of trust to D.

 

A defaults in making timely payments of the note and deed of trust to D and D initiates foreclosure by private power of sale.  D, the successor beneficiary then appoints E as the successor trustee.  E issues the necessary notices, scheduling the property for private sale, etc.

 

D, the beneficiary, and E, the successor trustee, cannot be the same person or entity.  It is less clear whether D could appoint an employee or officer of D, an immediate relative, etc.  For example, if D is an individual, can D's wife be the substitute trustee?  A strict reading of the statute might suggest that she could be.  But D would probably be better counseled to appoint a somewhat more remote substitute trustee even if the wife met the statutory requirements.  I would think that an individual employee or officer of a corporate beneficiary would be a different person or entity.  But it would still probably be inadvisable, even if legal.

 

In my view, the use of ReconTrust as the substitute trustee reflects the fact that BAC is morally bankrupt, as well as that management is completely tone deaf to the poor public relations implicit in trying to capture the very last nickel out of each foreclosure.

 

Contrast the policies of Fannie and Freddie, which have always required under their rules that foreclosure be initiated in the name of the servicer when such is allowed by law.  Fannie and Freddie want credit for financing American home ownership, but are quite crafty in distancing themselves from the foreclosures undertaken at their behest and direction.

 

BAC find no inconsistency in engaging in both criminal and unethical behavior on a day to day basis and then insisting that taxpayers bail out all of their losing bets to assure that management receives taxpayer funded bonuses.  And BAC will continue to do this as long as the American public continues to elect corrupt Democrats like Barrack Obama or the criminal Dems who inhabit the halls of the U.S. Senate.

 

Pres. Obama's election was orchestrated for the express purpose of obtaining immunity for these criminals!     

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Walt

Isn't it rather telling that Vermont Trotter's (Vermontt) inaugural post to the MS Fraud Forum was this spirited defense of swindler Maher Soliman within the thread "Who is M. Soliman?":

 

Vermontt at 02/13/12 at 04:31 PM

 

Quote:
"3) I have personally debriefed Maher Soliman. He is approachable without a doubt. He speaks in esoteric terms but if you have a basis of knowledge, the things he offers bring clarity of thought.

 

4) Are they usable before the district court?   I'm working on that part."

 

Not only can Vermont Trotter not articulate a coherent argument either in the District Court or on appeal, but he celebrates swindlers, such as Maher Soliman!

Only another swindler such as Neil Garfield would celebrate this bonehead!

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J

Walt, nice fine, amazing isn't it!

 

William A. Roper Jr. did point out in one of his post that the only truth told by Neil Garfield is in the title of his blog:  "Living Lies"

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Amused

Mr. Vermont Trotter seems to either be one of Neil Garfield's and Maher Soliman's swindler confederates promoting various debt elimination scams OR he is so rock dumb that he hasn't realized that he has been swindled by these scam artists. 

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t

Earlier within this thread, Walt said:

 

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The arguments identified in the Idaho Supreme Court's decision as forming the basis for your appeal shows that you were making legally incorrect and unsupportable arguments.

If you believe that the Idaho Supreme Court has misstated or falsely represented your arguments, why don't you post your appellate brief on Scribd and then post a link here.

 

Vermont Trotter's appellate brief in the case Trotter v. Bank of New York is posted on Scribd at:

 

http://www.scribd.com/doc/48396656/Trotter-Appellant-v-BONY-Mellon-Idaho-Supreme-Court-Appellant-s-Original-Brief

 

A cursory reading of this brief shows that Mr. Trotter lost his case in large part because he made vacuous and legally erroneous arguments.  As has been pointed out by others within this and a related thread, standing is a defensive argument which can be interposed to show that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine a case.

 

Standing is never a valid defense in a non-judicial foreclosure, nor can a distressed borrower ever bring a suit is respect of a non-judicial foreclosure and then argue that the defendant in the suit lacks standing to conduct a non-judicial sale.

 

The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court is unquestionably correct!

 

If Mr. Trotter has spent a fraction of the time he apparently devoted to flirting with swindlers and scam artists like Neil Garfield and Maher Soliman simply reading the posts by Mr. Roper and others here at the Forum, perhaps he might have developed a valid argument to use in his foreclosure case.  Instead, he distinguishes himself as simply another loser who is now a self-proclaimed "expert" who seeks to profit from the distress of others by leading them down the same path to slaughter!

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