Mortgage Servicing Fraud
occurs post loan origination when mortgage servicers use false statements and book-keeping entries, fabricated assignments, forged signatures and utter counterfeit intangible Notes to take a homeowner's property and equity.
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Does anyone have any information on if loans owned by Freddie and/or Fannie are normally securitized and placed into a REMIC trust?  
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dp
yes they are
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William A. Roper, Jr.
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Paul said:
Does anyone have any information on if loans owned by Freddie and/or Fannie are normally securitized and placed into a REMIC trust?


Some Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans are owned within the GSE's portfolio and funded through Fannie and Freddie debt obligations.  But most of the Fannie and Freddie mortgage are securitized, mostly in the form of mortgage pass through certificates exchanged for relatively snall pools of loans.  The certificates are guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie.

The securitization structure of each of the Fannie and Freddie deals are very similar to the other securitizations of that entity but somewhat dissimilar to the private securitizations of the typical subprime deals.

Fannie and Freddie were mostly exempt from many of the SEC registration requirements.  But both Fannie and Freddie have a much greater degree transparency that the banks and subprime lenders.  If you visit the Fannie and Freddie websites, you will find that the particulars of their securitization arrangements are described in great detail.  The Fannie and Freddie Sellers' and Servicers' guides are also readily available online.
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Mr. W... the premise here is hard to fathom... debit obligations> Are you talking about performing loans?

"Some Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loans are owned within the GSE's portfolio and funded through Fannie and Freddie debt obligations.  But most of the Fannie and Freddie mortgage are securitized, mostly in the form of mortgage pass through certificates exchanged for relatively snall pools of loans.  The certificates are guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie."
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Is there a way to look up your loan on fannie mae's web site ?  I have a MIN but I looked farther and found my loan is owned by Fannie mae.  To further complicate things my loan went from the original lender to countrywide who states that they own my loan with a loan number but fannie mae states they own the loan........How do you bring this up in court ?  

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connect the dots
Probably 94% of Countrywide's mortgages went to FNMA on a daily basis FROM DAY ONE OF COUNTRYWIDE'S EXISTENCE.

In your case it is a standing issue.


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DT wrote:

Is there a way to look up your loan on fannie mae's web site ?  I have a MIN but I looked farther and found my loan is owned by Fannie mae.  To further complicate things my loan went from the original lender to countrywide who states that they own my loan with a loan number but fannie mae states they own the loan........How do you bring this up in court ?  

is Countrywide saying they own your "loan" or  the mortgage? 

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Bac servicing claims to own the mortgage via MERS, the note how ever is endorsed to countrywide.  Yet like I said fannie mae owns the loan.  I happened to call fannie mae the other day to ask them what my loan number was since they are the owner, he wouldnt tell me....he told me to ask the servicer.  He also stated that they are the inversor...not the owner ???????  

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William A. Roper, Jr.
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DT said:
Bac servicing claims to own the mortgage via MERS, the note how ever is endorsed to countrywide.  Yet like I said fannie mae owns the loan.  I happened to call fannie mae the other day to ask them what my loan number was since they are the owner, he wouldnt tell me....he told me to ask the servicer.  He also stated that they are the inversor...not the owner ??????? 
 

It is very unlikely that BAC OWNS this loan UNLESS it was required to repuchase it.

In a typcial Fannie Mae securitization, the originator either sold the loan or exchanged the loan for Fannie Mae mortgage backed securities within about sixty days of origination.  Sometimes, smaller lenders first sell the loans to a corresponding lender such as a sale by ABC Mortgage to Countrywide and then Countrywide securitizes the loan with Fannie Mae.

In the typical Fannie securitization passing through an intermediate corresponding bank, the transaction and the promissory note would follow this sequence and path.

Usually the originating/corresponding lender would indorse the promissory note directly in favor of the corresponding bank (e.g. Countrywide) immediately upon loan closing.  The promissory note would be sent via overnight air to the corresponding bank.  The original mortgage would be either sent immediately for recording OR where the buyer is entitled to a three day right of rescission, it would be sent for record on the fourth day.

The corresponding lender would also typically be required to execute a mortgage assignment in favor of the correspondent bank.  This would also usually be recorded immediately following the mortgage or deed of trust.

The corresponding bank -- Countrywide -- would then indorse the instrument in blank and send it to the institutional custodian acting on behalf of the corresponding bank's warehousing lender.  Mortgage companies, even very large mortgage companies, are rarely loaning their own money.  They BORROW money to make loans and PAY THESE LOANS BACK as the loans are sold.  The warehousing loans are usually 60 or 90 day loans and the mortgage lender is expected to SELL all of its loan production before that period expires.

Each loan made is collateral for the warehousing line of credit, so the warehousing lender is usually required to deliver the original promissory note representing each new loan within 72 hours.

The note is therefore indorsed in blank and delivered to the warehousing lender.

The warehousing lender thereby becomes the holder of the note, while the corresponding bank remains the owner.

The corresponding bank then sells the loan to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or an institutional mortgage trust.  If "sold" to Fannie, the loan can either be directly sold or exchanged for mortgage backed securities.  In the former case, the loan appears on Fannie Mae's books with Fannie being the investor and owner.  In the latter case, Fannie merely guarantees the loans and issues mortgage backed securities for a small pool of loans exchanged together usually from a single issuer to form a very small pool.

In the latter case, Fannie Mae would really be merely the guarantor.  But it would also be the institutional trustee of the custom created trust into which the loans were pooled.  Fannie Mae doesn't really OWN these latter loans in an accouting sense.  They do not appear on Fannie Mae's books as an asset.

But Fannie acts as the trustee of the trust into which these loans were placed.

Now the originating lender or correspondent bank can either RETAIN the mortgage securities as an investment (in which case it remains the beneficial owner of the loans) OR it may SELL the mortgage securities to other investors.

An institution such as Countrywide wouldn't usually KEEP the mortgage backed securities, but a depository institution like CitiBank or Wells Fargo might.  The net effect of the transaction when the mortgage securities are retained is (a) to obtain a guarantee from Fannie Mae, (b) to assure the liquidity of the asset, which may be more quickly sold as mortgage securities than as whole loans, and (c) to change the characterization of the asset on the institutions books from mortgage loans to mortgage backed securities.

Each institutional trust, including trusts managed by Fannie and Freddie, typically has an identifiable institutional custodian which has been designated as the depository for the negotiatible instruments themselves.  These are placed in a so called custodial file.

So after sale (or exchange) to Fannie, Fannie would be the owner of the notes on its own behalf (or as trustee of the trust) as well as guarantor.  The institutional custodian would be the holder of the promissory note.  The servicer would retain the loan file as agent to Fannie, subject to audit by Fannie.

When foreclosure is initiated, the servicer is supposed to obtain the note from the institutional custodian and place it in the hands of the foreclosure mill law firm managing the foreclosure.  When the servicer obtains the note, it becomes the holder.  Fannie remains the owner and mortgage investor.  These terms are synonymous.

Very often, the foreclosure mill law firm instead obtains a COPY of the promissory note from the servicer's digital copy of the loan file.  This copy is very often UNINDORSED.  (Alternatively, the foreclosure mill will have someone executed a perjured lost note affidavit.)  The foreclosure mill law firm doesn't want to wait for receipt of the original.  The foreclosure mill law firm also doesn't want the responsibility for the original instrument.

When you speak to the typical person working for Fannie and manning the phones, the employee doesn't actually understand this process and has been instructed to uniformly LIE and deceive the public while referring all calls to the servicer.

Fannie usually expects its servicers to foreclose in the servicers' name so that the public isn't fully aware that the government is engaged in a systematic program of stealing people's homes while enriching corrupt politicians.  Voters are to be kept in the dark about this.
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William, I read everything you write about Freddie and anything UCC.  My assignment went out of MERS to Freddie.  I'm looking at an alleged "true copy" of my note.  The copy has an allonge indorsement from Lender to Bank.   The note itself has an indorsement in blank from Bank.

Given the nature of the process as outlined, what odds do you give that the allonge is a fraud, and the real true copy of the note in the custodian's possession has no allonge?






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FnDoomed said:
William, I read everything you write about Freddie and anything UCC.  My assignment went out of MERS to Freddie.  I'm looking at an alleged "true copy" of my note.  The copy has an allonge indorsement from Lender to Bank.   The note itself has an indorsement in blank from Bank.

Given the nature of the process as outlined, what odds do you give that the allonge is a fraud, and the real true copy of the note in the custodian's possession has no allonge?


The classic situation with allonge forgery is to cover the false pleading of the unindorsed copy.

The foreclosure mill, concerned with speed and efficiency and totally unconcerned with law, honesty and ethics, typically obtains an unindorsed copy of the note from the digital files of the servicer.  The real note is within the possession of the institutional custodian.

Most defendants and most foreclosure defense attorneys never even notice that the note isn't indorsed.  Since most foreclosures are UNDEFENDED, the plaintiff obtains a default judgment in judicial foreclosure states and simply conducts a non-judicial foreclosure through private sale in those places where this is permitted.

In the few instances where a borrower mounts a defense and raises a standing issue, the foreclosure mill attorneys, flailing from case to case under a crushing volume find it most convenient to have their in house or contract forgers simply fabricate an assignment to present to the court to explain the missing indorsement.

This, too, is usually pretty effective UNLESS and UNTIL the borrower successfully presses for the production of the original note.

When the original note is produced, it often turns out that it actually bears an indorsement on its face (or on back of the note).  Then, it is readily apparent that the indorsement appearing on the purported allonge is unnecessary.

If the original instrument contains an indorsement in blank, no further indorsement is necessary.

*

In 95% or more of the cases where there is an unnecessary indorsement by allonge, the allonge is going to be a post-commencement forgery to overcome the unindorsed copy of the note pled with the complaint.

*

Despite the buzz and spin that there were some epic or systemic problems in the securitization of the loans this is a total myth propagated by the foreclosure mill law firms, servicers and their contract forgers and perjurers.  They needed a cover story to use in explaining to their own employees why it was necessary for them to engage in one or other "shortcuts" (read forgery, fabrication and/or perjury) to "assist the court" in reaching a decision favorable to the purported mortgage investor.

The fabricated allonges and assignments are NOT belated corrective instruments to overcome some prior defects in the securitization.  They are bald forgeries to mislead the court! 
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I have a loan that was originated by table funding lender, sold to Countrywide, which serviced it until BOFA took over.  Freddie Mac is indicated as the investor/owner of the loan/note.  We have identified the loan in a Freddie Pool, with a CUSIP # but so far unable to locate the Trust.  We are in Chapter 13, and BOFA produced a copy of the note, with indorsements from original lender, to Countrywide Loan Servicing, to Countrywide Bank, and from Countrywide Bank to ? indorsed in blank.  There should be paperwork/assignments showing that the loan was sold to Freddie Mac??  We know that Freddie Mac instructs the servicers to not indorse the note to them, and not foreclosue in Freddie's name.  How important is it to find that Trust?  and how? 

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ka
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How important is it to find that Trust? and how?

With Freddie loans, the pool IS the trust!  You are DONE.  Only a swindler would tell you otherwise.

With the GSEs -- Fannie and Freddie -- the GSE usually either purchased the loan for portfolio investment or exchanged the loans for Fannie or Freddie pass-through certificates

Unlike the giant Wall Street securitizations, most of the GSE pools are very small.  But there are a LOT of them.  This is possible for two reasons. 

First, the GSE pools are standardized and do NOT require SEC registration statements.  The GSEs were exempt.

With the larger Wall Street pools, every new securitization involved certain legal and accounting due diligence, SEC registration statements and other disclosures, etc.  The cost of doing these, even when the firms were simply copying templates from the prior securitization made it more economic to create larger pools

There is essentially no cost to creating another Fannie or Freddie Pool, it is just given a new identifier and CUSIP number and each pool is essentially identical to the last except as to the included collateral and business terms.  The financial characteristics are different.  The legal characteristics are the same.

The second consideration which made for smaller GSE pools is that the investors purchasing the pass through securities were relying upon the Fannie or Freddie guaranty rather than the credit risk dynamics of the underlying collateral.

With the Wall Street pools, the mortgage collateral was assembled and assessed.  Supposedly, the purpose of the collateral selection was risk avoidance through portfolio effects, though once the investment banks found that they could assemble inferior mortgage product, sell it for a premium and then bet against it, even this idea was corrupted.

The idea of portfolio effects is to get a good regional distribution of loans into the pool, as well as loans with a variety of other credit dynamics.  The pool ought to ideally consist of loans of varying amounts and types, different kinds of borrowers, etc. 

For example, suppose that one had a pool of mortgages made solely to auto workers.  Such a pool would bear disproportionate credit risk to a downturn in the auto industry.  The same would be true if one had a pool consisting solely of loans to steel workers, etc.

While this might seem to be an unlikely occurrence, it naturally arises far more easily than one might otherwise expect.  For example, because of the historic concentration of automakers in Michigan and steel makers in Pittsburgh, a local lender might end up with risk concentrations in particular occupations simply by making loans to local customers.

Similarly, some credit unions are set up for a single company or a single industry, etc.  If that company falls into financial adversity and lays off a large portion of its workforce, the associated credit union could suffer.  For this reason, it makes more sense for the credit union to sell or exchange its mortgages for GSE pass through certificates.  The credit union might actually end up essentially owning the same loans (through the pass through certificates), but these are now blessed with a GSE guarantee.  The pass through certificates are now also liquid financial assets which can be quickly sold if the credit union later decides to divest itself of ownership of financial interest in these loans.

Historically, many lenders were local rather than national.  So lenders in Houston and Dallas had risk concentrations both business and consumer that involved the oil business, while lenders in Seattle where more concentrated in aerospace.  These local lenders could avoid excessive risk concentrations by exchanging their loans to the GSEs for pass through certificates.

What the mortgage investors and the ratings agencies were supposed to be watching out for in assessing the collateral in a pool was coinciding risk characteristics that might make a large proportion of the loans fail simultaneously.

With a GSE pool, the mortgage investor purchasing the pass through certificates were protected by the GSE guaranty rather than the characteristics of the individual pool.  And the GSEs supposedly managed the portfolio risk by guaranteeing large disparate pools, as well as adhering to responsible lending and underwriting guidelines.

If you visit the web sites of several swindlers who masquerade as foreclosure defense advocates, they will sell you a "securitization report" which will contain a lot of gibberish, none of which will actually be admissible in court anyway.  It appears that you already KNOW most of what you need to know about the securitization of your loan.

Read the many other posts at this Forum, especially posts by Mr. Roper and by Moose.
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Thanks,  this is the first I have had a direct response to this, as you cannot find much of any information on the internet on how the GSE securitization operates in relation to a private securitization. 

I did get this response from another source for comments on:

I agree that yes the sub pool is the trust however according to the Master Trust Agreements there are additional documents that are specific to each sub pool trust; such as a custodian, servicing, and trustee agreement. The important information that hopefully would be produced by these other documents would be the specific parties involved and the specific terms associated with whatever rights they do or do not have, including; the closing date of the Trusts, requirements of documentation transfer (Note/DoT or Mortgage, Assingments,etc)

 

For example, we know that Wells Fargo ABS handled a large amount of GSE trust certificate management as a master servicer. I do not of anyone that has been successful in obtaining the documents which specified that they (Wells Fargo in this example) have the rights to manage those ABS on behalf of the GSE. Nowhere in the master Trust agreement does it name Wells Fargo.

 

Deutsche is another great example. We know they are custodian for many of the GSE trusts, especially Indymac, Deutsche will admit to it without a fight upon a Duces Tecum subpeona, however other than after the fact documentation that has been produced by OneWest, for the purpose of litigation (which I believe is a product of LPS or a similar documentation production process) we have yet to see any custodial agreement produced that would have appointed Duetsche as the initial custodian of the Trust.

 

These document are referred to in the Single Family Master Trust agreements. They should exist and are relied upon by the Banksters in court, but I hav to see them produced.


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ka
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Thanks, this is the first I have had a direct response to this, as you cannot find much of any information on the internet on how the GSE securitization operates in relation to a private securitization. 


This is simply not true.  The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitization models are decades old, are almost totally transparent and have worked essentially the same way for several decades.

The difference is that with the private Wall Street trusts, the information for each newly created trust is posted at the SEC website, while the GSEs publish and post their information on their own websites.

But trying to understand the GSE securitization process is almost a complete waste of time.  Their is almost nothing sinister about it, other than the business model that allows the originator to shift essentially all of the default risk of each new loan to the GSE and ultimately to the taxpayers.

It is unclear to me what you think you are going to discover going down this path.  Perhaps you are under the mistaken belief that further investigation will somehow reveal that there was a "securitization fail" or that the securitization otherwise did not take place.  If you have bought into this myth, then you are already in far deeper trouble, as this myth has no reality in fact and instead has simply been a pretext invented by conspriacy theorists and then exploited by a number of swindle artists who have been peddling so called debt elimination scams.

This Forum contains a number of useful threads discussing effective strategies for defending against a judicial foreclosure.  Strategies relating to non-judicial foreclosure are even more challenging in most jurisdictions and often are best pursued in a bankruptcy setting.

While it is probably a good idea to get a rudimentary understanding of the securitization process, if you spend more than a couple of hours on this you are really wasting your time.  If you plan on basing a defense on the idea that there is a defect in GSE securitization, your time would probably be better spent looking for a new home to rent or scouting out homeless shelters.  If you want to stay in your home, study the other threads here, ask some other topical questions presenting a few specific facts and move on to more productive defensive strategies!
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ka
Begin your further inquiry of Fannie Mae mortgage pass-through securities here:

http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/funding-the-market/mbs/index.html


Begin your further inquiry of Freddie Mac mortgage pass-through securities here:

http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/html/legal_doc.html

http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/html/sd_pc_lookup.html


*

If you really want a comprehensive understanding of GSE securitization, most good college or graduate leval finance textbooks on mortgage securities, fixed income securities and asset backed securitization can readily acquaint you with the process.  Since these securities also form the basis for many investment portfolios, other finance texts used in courses on investing would also have a chapter acquainting you with the process.

Titles authored or edited by Frank FABOZZI are exemplary, but by no means exclusive sources of this information:

http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=Frank+Fabozzi&x=0&y=0

The books tend to be quite expensive business titles, though.  Many would be found at a good academic library at universities with strong schools of business administration and strong finance departments.  Foremost of these would probably be Wharton (University of Pennsylvania), Columbia, and New York University.  You can usually search academic library card catalogues online, so consider searching the libraries of large nearby universities.  You are unlikely to find these texts within the holdings of a community college or smaller community library.

Find the shelf containing one or more FABOZZI titles and then browse the other books on the shelf.  Or you could just read Mr. Roper's Forum posts.

Hopefully, your further reading is due to academic interest in this topic.  If this research undertaking is intended as a source of material on foreclosure defense, you really out to scout out homeless shelters first.  Your time would otherwise be far better spent reading Forum threads, reading statutes, rules and cases for your jurisdiction or visiting a good academic law library. 
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Thanks for the info:

I am more curious, than hanging on securitization for defense.  I have been involved with this for over a year now, and I have plenty of documentation to show break in the chain of title...

I am curious if my loan was really securitized by Countrywide privately and also by Freddie,  ala, Taylor, Bean Whittaker. 

I am in BK court now and no relief of stay has yet to be requested,  I am aniticpating it happening of course.

I have heard alot about how difficult is to find a particular loan in a GSE trust.  I happened to have found mine through information a data analyst had access to, that identified my loan, so I guess I thought that would be interesting to see what else could be found.  I know of someone else that has a Freddie Mac loan identified, and he was able to track the loan in and out of the pool into other pool's,  pretty interesting the shell game being played with the loans.
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t

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I am curious if my loan was really securitized by Countrywide privately and also by Freddie, ala, Taylor, Bean Whittaker.  


The fraud at TBW mostly involved (a) pledging of non-existent loans and (b) double pledging of loans to warehousing lenders rather than mulitple sales of loans to multiple mortgage trusts.  (Mr. Roper has discussed warehousing lending in other threads.)

Despite dark consiracy theorists, there is no evidence whatsoever that other originators were also doing this.  To the contrary, most of the subprime operators were enormously profitable through both origination fraud and oppressive fees.  Double pledging might have brought the bubble to an end far more quickly.

Realize that one of the GSEs actually detected the fraud by TBW, but instead of blowing the whistle on the criminality, simply ceased doing business with TBW.

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I know of someone else that has a Freddie Mac loan identified, and he was able to track the loan in and out of the pool into other pool's, pretty interesting the shell game being played with the loans.


Either your friend is deceiving you, has been deceived himself or misunderstands the transactional records he is assessing.  What you describe almost never happens, especially with GSE loans.

Once a loan finds its way into a pool, it would almost never again be sold or traded EXCEPT FOR the situation where the loan was identified as having been included in breach of the lending and underwriting guidelines.  In this case, the mortgage investor would enforce the seller's warranty and require the repurchase of this particular loan by the entity selling the loan into securitization based upon the false representations.

When a loan is rquired to be repurchased, it is then removed from the pool and either another similar loan is substituted or the pool is repaid in cash for the unwinding of the transaction.

Therefore ONLY those loans which are required to be repurchased would EVER be available for inclusion in another different pool.

There is another way that a loan might be included in another downstream pool, but this was done indirectly without any actual subsequent sale or exchange of the loan itself.  This is very confusing to unsophisticated borrowers and has therefore been a source of much misunderstanding.

In discussions by ka above, ka explains that GSE loans were exchanged into various pass through pools.

These pass through securities or the trust certificates for a private trust can be used as collateral in a subsequent trust.

The easiest analogy for the financially sophisticated would be one mutual fund or hedge fund investing in the shares of another mutual fund or hedge fund.  Generally, the mutual fund (usually a form of equity trust) would invest directly in traded shares of a corporate entity.  Suppose that some fund bought 10% of the shares in the XYZ Corporation.  Now if a second fund invested in the shares of the first fund, it would be an indirect owner of an interest in XYZ Corporation, though it would not be the legal owner of any shares at all (at least in respect of the first fund's ownership).

If the value of XYZ shares went up markedly, so might the value of shares in the first fund (all other things being equal).  The second fund could also then show an increase in the net asset value of its shares (again all other things being equal).

In a financial prospectus or regular quarterly or annual disclosure, the second fund ought to disclose or discuss its ownership of shares of the first fund.  If the first fund was highly enough concentrated and the second fund's interests significant enough to merit an in depth discussion of risks, the second fund might disclose its exposure to volatility in the XYZ share price, even though it owns no XYZ shares.

In the same way, some collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) used trust certificates representing particular tranches (payment streams) or other mortgage pass through certificates as collateral for another trust.  Think of these as mortgage security mutual funds.

If a CMO purchased the entire issue of a small pass through pool, it would truly own the beneficial interest of all of the underlying mortgages.  But the unliquidated GSE pool actually still owns the mortgages.

A disclosure might still show the financial characteristics of the underlying mortgage.

A number of swindlers have been misrepresenting the nature and character of various securitizations.  Swindlers will even produce a false securitization report which seems to contradict plaintiff allegations and gives the borrower some hope of prevailing.  But these reports are not even admissible as evidence.

If someone is telling you that your mortgage found its way into a Freddie pool and then later was also sold into another different pool, it is not the mortgage investor that has been the victim of fraud, but rather YOU are the victim!  Try to gather as much specific information about these fraudsters as you are readily able.  Their names are well known, but the fraudsters front men use their sites merely to gather suckers and then refer leads to a myriad of other sites and entities who will then fleece the distressed borrower.

The idea that there is some shell game with the trading of mortgages is simply a MYTH perpetrated by the swindlers.  Most of the mortgages were originated either by a Fannie/Freddie servicer or one of the subprime operators OR their captive corresponding lender.  The corresponding lender sold the loan ONCE to the entity which agreed to purchase the loan.  In the case of GSE loans, the loan was then usually sold (or exchanged) directly to the GSE, which gave best execution on prime loans.

In the case of subprime loans, the loans were usually laundered through two intermediate entities, a bankruptcy remote trading subsidiary of the subprime lender (Sponsor) and a bankruptcy remote subsidiary of a Wall Street firm (Depositor).  Mr. Roper has explained this in previous posts.  The same entities were used over and over again in various securitizations.  There is nothing mysterious about this at all. 

If someone offers to sell you a report showing the multiple trading or pledging of your mortgage after its sale to a GSE, or if someone has already sold you such a report, you probably need to contact your state attorney general and local prosecutor as quickly as possible.

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david
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It is unclear to me what you think you are going to discover going down this path.  Perhaps you are under the mistaken belief that further investigation will somehow reveal that there was a "securitization fail" or that the securitization otherwise did not take place.  If you have bought into this myth, then you are already in far deeper trouble, as this myth has no reality in fact and instead has simply been a pretext invented by conspriacy theorists and then exploited by a number of swindle artists who have been peddling so called debt elimination scams.                  


Except in my case Freddie Mac claims to own the loan, so we must assume it was securitized.  A Wall Street bank has entered the Bankruptcy Court with a claim alleging to be a secured party with right to enforce (foreclose).  In debtor's subsequent  Adversary Proceeding, the bank answers that securitization of the underlying note is a claim proceeding from plaintiff's imagination.

Here, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to demonstrate securitization and the governance of the PSA in order to resist the actions of the bank in their effort to be granted relief from stay and foreclose.  Freddie Mac will not say anything and the facts are accessible only in discovery.

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Bill
david wrote:
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It is unclear to me what you think you are going to discover going down this path.  Perhaps you are under the mistaken belief that further investigation will somehow reveal that there was a "securitization fail" or that the securitization otherwise did not take place.  If you have bought into this myth, then you are already in far deeper trouble, as this myth has no reality in fact and instead has simply been a pretext invented by conspriacy theorists and then exploited by a number of swindle artists who have been peddling so called debt elimination scams.                  


Except in my case Freddie Mac claims to own the loan, so we must assume it was securitized.  A Wall Street bank has entered the Bankruptcy Court with a claim alleging to be a secured party with right to enforce (foreclose).  In debtor's subsequent  Adversary Proceeding, the bank answers that securitization of the underlying note is a claim proceeding from plaintiff's imagination.

Here, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to demonstrate securitization and the governance of the PSA in order to resist the actions of the bank in their effort to be granted relief from stay and foreclose.  Freddie Mac will not say anything and the facts are accessible only in discovery.


Because Freddie/Fannie buy a mortgage in no way means it was put in any kind of security.  You know what they say about assuming.
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Chuck

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Except in my case Freddie Mac claims to own the loan, so we must assume it was securitized. A Wall Street bank has entered the Bankruptcy Court with a claim alleging to be a secured party with right to enforce (foreclose). In debtor's subsequent Adversary Proceeding, the bank answers that securitization of the underlying note is a claim proceeding from plaintiff's imagination.
 

 

Freddie probably claims to own the note because it does own the note.

 

The Wall Street bank presumably is claiming a right to enforce the note because it claims to be the holder of the note.  The holder is the entity with the right to enforce the instrument.  Ownership and holdership are two different concepts.

 

Simply because a bank is asserting a right of enforcement, it does not follow that the loan was sold into a private securitization.

 

You seem to be making assumptions for which there is no valid basis.

 

If Freddie claims to own the note, it might own it outright as a consequence of a portfolio purchase of a whole loan or as trustee of a pool of loans exchanged for Freddie mortgage pass-through certificates.

 

This latter would be a GSE securitization.  There is no separate PSA for such a pool.  The selling and servicing of the loan would be controlled by the Freddie sellers and servicers agreement and the Freddie Guide.

 

About half the loans "owner" by Freddie are owned outright and half were securitized mostly through the pass-through certificates mentioned.

 

None of this seems to get you closer to a viable defense because you are seemingly focused on wingnut theories rather than viable defensive avenues.

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david
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  Because Freddie/Fannie buy a mortgage in no way means it was put in any kind of security.  


But its probable:

Single-Family Credit Guarantee Business

In our Single-Family business, we use mortgage securitization to fund millions of home loans every year. Securitization is a process by which we purchase home loans that lenders originate, put these loans into mortgage securities that are sold in global capital markets, and recycle the proceeds back to lenders. This recycling is designed to ensure that lenders have mortgage money to lend.

What makes the securitization process work? Families paying their mortgages every month. Because once a family moves into their home, their monthly payments of mortgage principal and interest are transferred ultimately to securities investors. When a family stops making payments – often due to loss of income – Freddie Mac steps in and makes those payments to securities investors. Managing this risk, known as credit risk, is how we generate revenue. Each time we fund a loan, we collect a credit guarantee fee from the lender selling us the loan. This fee is intended to protect us in case of loan default.




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david
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About half the loans "owner" by Freddie are owned outright and half were securitized mostly through the pass-through certificates mentioned.

 



Where do you get the data that half were/are owned outright?  And if owned outright, in what capacity?  Did the swap, substitute, collect default insurance.  Any insurance collected is applicable to your loan balance.

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Bill
david wrote:
Quote:

About half the loans "owner" by Freddie are owned outright and half were securitized mostly through the pass-through certificates mentioned.

 



Where do you get the data that half were/are owned outright?  And if owned outright, in what capacity?  Did the swap, substitute, collect default insurance.  Any insurance collected is applicable to your loan balance.


You've been reading living lies too much and taking advice from other swindlers like Neil Garfield.

Good luck.
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Chuck

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Where do you get the data that half were/are owned outright?   And if owned outright, in what capacity?   Did the swap, substitute, collect default insurance.   Any insurance collected is applicable to your loan balance.
 

 

I simply looked at the published Freddie Mac financial statements.

 

For example, Freddie posts a monthly volume and holdings summary within its Investor pages:

 

http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/volsum/

 

The most recent month is December 2011:

 

http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/volsum/pdf/1211mvs.pdf

 

I was shooting from the hip when I said it was half and half.  The mix has changed over time.  It appears that the current mix is slightly in favor of portfolio ownership.  I had recalled these figures being more closely in balance.  Since the monthly report is unfamiliar to you, I will walk you through the numbers.

 

Table 1 shows Freddie's portfolio mortgage investments.  You will see columns for "Purchases and Issuances", "Sales", "Liquidations", "Net Increase" and "Ending Balance".  This latter column shows that Freddie's portfolio investment in mortgages at the end of December 2011 (year end) was $2.075 TRILLION.

 

Table 4 on page 2 of the report shows Freddie's Mortgage-Related Securities and Guarantee Commitments.  The year end figure was $1.645 TRILLION.  These are the mortgages which were subject to a Freddie Guarantee placed in pools in exchange for Freddie pass-through certificates.

 

So the correct figures are $2.075 trillion vs. $1.645 trillion.  In other words, 55.78% of the mortgages (by balance) are portfolio and 44.22% are in trust pools.

 

You could also find this information within Freddie's published quarterly or annual reports which may be found at Freddie's website or the Securities and Exchange Commission's EDGAR site.

 

So contrary to your assertion, it is MORE LIKELY that a given loan (by balance, as opposed to loan count) would be in Freddie's portfolio rather than held in trust for pool certificate holders.

 

*

 

As Bill pointed out in the prior post, your assertion that guarantees, pool insurance proceeds, primary insurance proceeds, credit default swaps or any other forms of credit protection would absolve a borrower of even one dime of liability are totally specious.  There is no legal validity to this assertion whatsoever.  It is simply a myth propagated by swindlers who use this as a pretext to scam distressed borrowers out of money to "investigate" the possibility of such credit enhancement.

 

The mark or pigeon will be swindled out of hundreds or thousands of dollars, depending upon the size of the loan, on the assurance that the swindler will help relieve them of their liability.  When the arguments are rejected by the court, as they ALWAYS ARE SINCE THE ARGUMENT HAS NO LEGAL MERIT, the borrower will be told it was because the judge was corrupt or incompetent.

 

THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A SINGLE CASE ANYWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES WHERE A BORROWER AVOIDED LIABILITY FOR A LOAN AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS NONSENSICAL ARGUMENT.  

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angelicaB
A select number of people are getting a mortgage write-down under the “robo-signing” settlement. However, those with mortgages backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are being hung out to dry.

The settlement is from the probe into “robo signing,” when banks initiate foreclosure proceedings on homeowners, some of which weren’t even behind on payments, aside from other malfeasance.

The settlement, according to CNN, only is going to result in mortgage write-downs, or a reduced principal, for 1 million people. This leaves the bulk of mortgage holders in the United States that are underwater to twist in the wind.
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Mr. Roper - it appears that promissory notes are gathered by the banks with no money down and I wonder if their enrichment might be considered unjust
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If my loan was indeed securitized by Freddie Mac, and the original lender was IndyMac Bank that was taken over by the FDIC as receiver, who then created a new entity called IndyMac Federal Bank, who sold all remaining assets to One West Bank, then how could IndyMac Federal Bank foreclose on my property 6 months after they were sold to One West Bank. In fact, the assignment of Deed of Trust and Appointment of Successor Trustee were filed in the county a month after IndyMac was sold to One West Bank. In all foreclosure documents, IndyMac Federal Bank was listed as the party to whom the debt was owed. The true party of interest was never identified, as required under the WASHINGTON DEED OF TRUST ACT. MERS assigned the deed through a robosigned assignment to an entity that was no longer in business and then that entity named a new trustee that handled the foreclosure action. Freddie Mac allegedly bought the property at the foreclosure sale with a credit bid. Under Wash RCW's, only a true beneficiary can bid with a credit bid. The Washington Supreme Court just ruled that MERS could not be a beneficiary under the Wash. DTA. They also stated that it was unlikely that MERS could do an assignment because they were never owner of the note or a true party of interest in the deed of trust. That being said, how could Freddie Mac legally aquire title to my property in a foreclosure sale that was more than likely fraudulent? I know the law works in funny ways but I have yet to figure out how a non-entity can do that. Any thoughts?
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What 'loan' are you talking about?  Everyone says that FHLMC or FNMA bought the loan or securitized the loan, or owns the loan - what loan?  A Deed of Trust is NOT a loan.  A Promissory Note is NOT a loan.  A Payoff statement is not a loan.  A title 'report' is just an insurance policy - it is not a loan.  

Your loan application was NOT a loan and all it generated for you was a Note and a Deed of Trust and a Payoff Statement and a Title insurance policy, so you applied for a loan but you never got one.  Do you have a receipt showing how much money the bank gave you, or how much they paid on your behalf?  NO - and you won't be able to get one either!

The Promissory Note is nothing more than a check and the DoT is a guarantee for the check.  Where is the loan document that describes a sum of money that was given to, or paid out on behalf of Borrower by the "pretender-lender"?  There is NONE!

So, there is no loan for Indymac %$#! to own!  There is a photocopy of a Note that has been separated from the DoT and sliced and diced and sold a hundred times and levered a thousand times, and if Indymac cannot demonstrate that at some point in time the original Note was actually in their possession then they have no right to foreclose.  But good luck finding an attorney or a judge to support you on that!  They let the banks steal homes at will and unless we get out in force and demand that our WA State Governor take action on our behalf they will continue to rob us at will.

Take a photograph of a $5 bill to the supermarket and try to buy a loaf of bread with it.  Won't happen.  But take a photocopy of a $500,000 check to court and they'll let you throw a family into the street - odd, don't you think?
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